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Abstract 
 
Trading Patterns of Corporate Insiders Prior to 




Securities class action announcements tend to have a significant negative effect on a 
firm’s stock price. This thesis explores whether corporate insiders exhibit trading patterns 
that would suggest that they exploit any potential information advantages they may have 
over other market participants. Furthermore, we consider information asymmetries 
between different types of insiders by comparing abnormal net sales between managers 
and non-managing insiders, between top-level managers and low-level managers, and 
between financial managers and non-financial managers. We show that managers have 
higher abnormal net sales than non-managing insiders, and that top-level managers have 
higher abnormal net sales than low-level managers prior to lawsuit announcements. 
Finally, we examine the relation between abnormal stock returns and abnormal net sales 
prior to lawsuit announcements. We find a significant negative correlation between 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal net sales by managers and by top-level managers. 
Our evidence suggests that managers may engage in net selling in anticipation of the 
negative stock returns that are typically associated with securities class action 
announcements. In particular, high-rank insiders appear to place more profitable trades 
than low-rank insiders prior to lawsuit announcements. 
 
    iv   
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my appreciation to the members of my thesis committee: Dr. 
Thomas Walker, Dr. Lorne Switzer, and Dr. Rahul Ravi. Especially, I appreciate my thesis 
supervisor, Dr. Thomas Walker, for his valuable help and insightful guidance throughout 
this project and more importantly for his continuous encouragement.  
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Kuntara Pukthuanthong at San Diego State 
University for her valuable comments and suggestions on this paper. Moreover, I would 
like to thank my schoolmate, Rui Guo, for his helps in data collection and analysis. Finally, 
I would like to thank my parents for their emotional support and understanding throughout 
my studies.  
 
    v   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables and Figures   ………………………………………………... vi 
1. Introduction     ..………………………………………………………….. 1 
2. Literature review     ..……………………………………………………. 5 
3. Data and sample description     ……………………………………….….. 9 
 3.1. Data     …………………………………….………….………….. 9 
 3.2. Descriptive statistics     …………………………………….……. 10 
4. Methodology      ………………………………….….. …………………. 13 
 4.1. Announcement effects      ………………………………….…....... 13 
 4.2. Insider trading activities in sued firms      ……………………….... 15 
  4.2.1. Measures of insider trading      ……………………….......... 15 
  4.2.2. Abnormal insider trading activities      …………................... 16 
  4.2.3. Categorizing insider trades by insider roles      …………...... 17 
  4.2.4. Factors influencing insider trading      …………................... 18 
5. Empirical results      …………...................………......……..................... 20 
5.1. Abnormal stock price performance around lawsuit filings      …..... 21 
 5.2. Time series patterns in insider trading around lawsuits filings    ....... 23 
5.3. Comparison of abnormal net sales by different types of insiders  …... 27 
5.4. Univariate analysis      …………...................………......……........ 30 
5.5. Regression analysis      …………...................………......……....... 32 
5.6. Abnormal insider trading and CARs      …………...................….. 36 
6. Conclusions      .………………………………………………………….. 40 
References      .………….…………………………………………………... 43 
Appendix      .………….……………………………………………………. 92 
    vi   
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Sample Description      ……………………………………….……… 47 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Insider Trading      …………………………… 50 
Table 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Sued Firms    ……………. 51 
Table 4: Expected Insider Trading Activities in Sued Firms    .....……………... 52 
Table 5: Number of Sued Firms with Insider Trades around Lawsuit Filings   .... 54 
Table 6: Insider Trading Activities around Lawsuit Filings (Trade-Based)     .... 56 
Table 7: Insider Trading Activities around Lawsuit Filings (Volume-Based)  .... 63 
Table 8: Comparison of Abnormal Net Sales by Different Types of Insiders 
 (Trade-Based)    …………………………………………………..….…..... 70 
Table 9: Comparison of Abnormal Net Sales by Different Types of Insiders 
 (Volume-Based)    …………………………………………..……………. 74 
Table 10: Preliminary Examination of Abnormal Cumulative Returns    ……… 78 
Table 11: Preliminary Examination of Abnormal Net Sales    ……….……….. 80 
Table 12: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Stock Returns    ……………. 83 
Table 13: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Insider Trading    …………. 85 
Table 14: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Net Insider Sales on CARs  .... 87 
Figure 1: Average Abnormal Returns during the 250 Days 




The majority of securities class actions in the United States are filed under Rule 10b-5 
of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, which prohibits misstating or omitting material 
information in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. Securities class action 
lawsuits originating from private litigation play an important role in the enforcement of 
Rule l0b-5. Investors who suffer financial losses as a result of the alleged securities law 
violations by a firm’s management can bring a class action suit against the firm and its 
managers. According to a recent NERA Economic Consulting Report, the median investor 
loss in settled securities class action cases increased gradually from $64 million in 1996 to 
over $300 million in 2004. In the past three years, driven by the credit crisis, the number of 
securities class action filings increased from 130 in 2006 to a peak of 253 in 2008. 




In a typical securities class action, a firm and its managers are sued by shareholders 
for providing misleading information or withholding negative information on material 
facts for a period of time called the “class period.” As a result, investors purchase the 
firm’s stock at an artificially inflated price during the class period. They suffer wealth 
losses from stock price drops when the true information is revealed and thus are 
potentially eligible for compensation. Securities class action lawsuits represent a twofold 
problem for uninformed investors. Investors not only suffer financial losses resulting 
                                                        
1 “Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2009 Year-End Update”, page 1, www.nera.com 
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from the managers’ illegal behavior. They also face the potential problem that managers 
use their proprietary knowledge to engage in informed trading prior to lawsuit filings. In 
this paper, we examine the stock market reaction to the filing of a securities class action 
lawsuit. Furthermore, we investigate potential information asymmetries among corporate 
insiders and uninformed investors by examining insider trading patterns prior to lawsuit 
filings. 
We first focus on the wealth effects of securities class action lawsuit filings. A 
lawsuit filing usually has a detrimental effect on the sued firm’s stock performance. 
Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1998) examine the effect of corporate lawsuits on the equity 
value of the parties. They find that sued firms experience “economically meaningful and 
statistically significant wealth losses upon the filing of the suit.” (page 6). Similarly, 
Griffin et al. (2000) observe a significant and negative short-term price response to 
securities class action lawsuit filings. They also suggest that insiders are able to anticipate 
a lawsuit filing and the average stock price drop following the filing. Loh and 
Rathinasamy (2004) show that IPO-related class action lawsuits filings result in an 
abnormal return of –2.10% on the announcement day, which is significant at the 1% 
significant level. Gande and Lewis (2009) examine stock price reactions to the filings of 
605 securities class action lawsuits. They observe a CAR of -4.66% over the event 
window (-1, 1), representing an average loss of $355.65 million in shareholder wealth. In 
line with these studies, we expect that securities class actions to have a significant 
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negative effect on investors’ wealth once they are announced. Thus, we expect significant 
negative excess stock returns around the filing date. Our event study results support this 
expectation. 
Our main analysis focuses on examining trends in insider trading prior to securities 
class action lawsuit announcements. Prior research examining insider behavior around 
selected corporate events such as dividend initiations, bankruptcy or initial public 
offerings shows that insiders know about forthcoming events and suggests that they may 
use their privileged access to information in their personal trading decisions (e.g., John 
and Lang, 1991; Iqbal and Shetty, 2002; and Schultz, 2003). These findings suggest that 
insiders tend to purchase before events that produce positive stock returns and sell before 
events that produce negative returns. We hypothesize that securities class action lawsuits 
are not entirely unexpected for corporate officers, particularly those who were actively 
engaged in the alleged fraud. Moreover, insiders can act on negative information by 
selling part or all of their holding or reducing their purchases of stock. Either action 
increases an insider’s net sales, defined as sales minus purchases. Therefore, we expect 
that insiders display increased net sales prior to securities class action lawsuit filings. 
Such a finding would indicate a violation of strong form market efficiency. 
Furthermore, we examine information asymmetries among different types of insiders. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines insiders as officers, directors, 
and any principal shareholders who hold more than 10% of the ownership in a given firm. 
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Officers and directors are expected to have greater access to private information than 
principal shareholders, and their trades are more informative (Seyhun, 1988). Seyhun and 
Bradley (1997) investigate insider trading prior to bankruptcy filings and find that selling 
patterns are stronger for officers and top executives. They suggest that top executives are 
more likely to trade on private information than other insiders. In the context of our study, 
we expect that managers have an information advantage over non-managing insiders for 
two reasons: first, it is the managers themselves who likely committed the fraud and thus 
know about the risk of being sued; second, we expect that higher-rank managers (e.g., top 
executives) may have an information advantage over lower-rank managers (e.g., 
divisional officers) in lawsuits. In addition, managers in specific functions may have an 
information advantage over managers in other areas, especially for certain types of 
allegations. For example, a firm’s CFO, treasurer and controller are in a good role to 
observe GAAP violations or other accounting-related frauds and may even be responsible 
for committing these frauds in the first place. Given their superior information, they may 
sell their privately owned shares to avoid personal financial losses in anticipation of a 
potential lawsuit. Thus, we expect that insiders with a bigger information advantage tend 
to exhibit more aggressive trading activities than less informed insiders. Our empirical 
results support these expectations. From both an ethical and legal perspective, our results 
provide some interesting new insights into the principal-agent conflict between a firm’s 
management and its shareholders. Not only do shareholders suffer losses as a result of a 
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firm being sued, they also have to stand by as some managers (who may have committed 
the securities law violations in the first place) exploit their proprietary knowledge about 
the firm’s heightened litigation risk to trade for their own personal benefit. 
Our study contributes to the literature on insider trading in several ways. First, we 
extend the literature by investigating insider trading behavior prior to shareholder 
litigation announcements. Second, we provide evidence on the presence of unusual 
insider trading activity prior to litigation announcements. Lastly, we explore information 
asymmetries among different types of insiders. The remainder of this paper proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 reviews some of the related literature on the relevance of insider 
trading. Section 3 describes our data sources and provides sample characteristics. Section 
4 presents our methodology. Section 5 discusses our empirical results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
There is a wealth of literature on the relevance of insider trading. Most prior studies 
suggest that insider trading behavior and changes in insiders’ stockholdings signal 
information about the firm’s value due to information asymmetries between insiders and 
outside investors. Earlier studies by Lorie and Jaffe (1974), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), 
Lin and Howe (1990), Seyhun (1988, 1992), Meulbroek (1992), Jeng, Metrick and 
Zeckhauser (2003) and Fishe and Robe (2004) suggest that insiders are better informed 
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and can time the market. Their empirical evidence shows significant abnormal stock 
returns around the reporting date of insider transactions. Insider purchases/sales tend to 
be preceded by negative/positive abnormal stock returns and are followed by 
positive/negative abnormal stock returns. Nevertheless, Chopra et al. (1992), Hong et al. 
(2000) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider sales are not informative for 
large firms, but for smaller firms, which tend to display a higher level of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Moreover, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) 
suggest that the informativeness of insiders’ activities is tired to purchases, not sales, 
likely because insiders do not have to announce purchases in advance whereas proposed 
sales have to be announced to the SEC on Form 144 at least three months in advance. 
A sizeable stream of research examines insider behavior around corporate events. 
These events typically cause significant stock price changes apart from the effects of 
insider sales and purchases. Insider trades are linked to insiders’ knowledge of the 
forthcoming events. While most empirical evidence suggests that insiders trade on their 
informational advantage, the results are not always consistent. Studies that examine 
insider trading around corporate events such as takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990), dividend 
announcements (John and Lang, 1991; Cheng and Leung, 2008), stock repurchases (Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch, 1992; Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2003), information-sensitive 
security issues (Lee and Loughran, 1998; Kahle, 2000) and bankruptcy (Seyhun and 
Bradley, 1997; Iqbal and Shetty, 2002) show that abnormal insider trades increase prior 
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to these events. However, evidence on the relationship between insider trading and 
bankruptcy filings is not consistent. Loderer and Sheehan (1989) and Gosnell, Keown, 
and Pinkerton (1992) find no evidence of insider trading on private information before 
bankruptcy announcements for firms listed on major exchanges. The evidence on insider 
trading before earnings announcements is also mixed. Givoly and Palmon (1985), 
Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) and Noe (1999) find little association between insider 
trading and subsequent earning announcements. Nevertheless, Ke, Huddart and Petroni 
(2003) find that insiders trade on their knowledge about forthcoming earnings 
announcements as long as 2 years prior to the announcements. Moreover, they suggest 
that insiders engage in little abnormal trading in the two quarters immediately prior to 
earning announcements to avoid potential legal jeopardy. 
Restricting the analysis to securities fraud, studies of corporate litigation events 
examine the informativeness of insider activities, with mixed findings. Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1996) investigate insider trading patterns in 92 firms that are subject to 
SEC enforcement actions for violation of GAAP but find no statistically significant 
abnormal insider sales during the earnings misrepresentation period. Nevertheless, 
Summers and Sweeney (1998) examine insider trading activities prior to 51 news media 
announcements of financial statement fraud and find that, prior to these announcement, 
insiders reduce their stockholding through significant selling activities. Beneish (1999) 
examines 64 firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for violating GAAP. He finds that 
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insiders sell their shares before the public discovery of earnings overstatements and 
suggests that insiders trade on their private information for their personal benefit. Some 
of the empirical literature on insider trading in relation to class action litigation has 
focused on the merits of the suits (e.g. whether managers deliberately delayed the 
disclosure of material negative information). The release of negative information that 
triggers securities class actions typically causes substantial stock price drops at the end of 
the class period. Abnormal insider sales during the class period provide evidence on 
managers’ incentives to delay negative information disclosures and thus the merit of a 
securities class action. Niehaus and Roth (1999) examine insider sales in 63 firms subject 
to securities class actions and find no abnormal insider sales during the class period. 
Griffin and Grundfest (2002) use a larger sample of 842 securities class action lawsuits to 
examine insider trading activities during the class period. They find that net insider sales 
of sued firms during the class period are higher than those before or after the class period 
and higher than those of matched firms during the same period. Therefore, they claim that 
unusual insider sales provide a strong indication of fraud in a securities class action 
litigation. Iqbal, Shetty, and Wang (2007) examine insider trading in 340 sued firms 
around securities class actions. They find no significant insider sales during the class 
period. However, they show that insiders increase their shareholdings immediately before 
the class period, suggesting that insiders profit from artificially inflated stock prices 
during the class period. 
9 
 
3. Data and sample description 
3.1. Data 
We use Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC),2 which tracks 
federal securities class action lawsuits since 1996, to identify 2,145 lawsuits filed 
between January 2000 and December 2008. To keep the lawsuits in our sample more 
homogeneous, we exclude 299 IPO laddering, 67 analyst and 25 mutual fund cases.
3
 We 
further exclude lawsuits in which firms are sued more than once in one year to reduce any 
estimation biases that may result from overlapping litigations. In addition, we exclude 
lawsuits in which sued firms do not have price records on the CRSP daily NYSE/AMEX 
or Nasdaq tapes at least two years before the lawsuit announcement; and those in which 
sued firms do not have accounting data in the Compustat database at the fiscal year end 
before the lawsuit announcement. This reduces the size of our litigation sample to 738 
securities class action lawsuits. For each lawsuit, we collect information on the filing date, 
the class period, the alleged securities law violations, and the applicable securities laws 
under which a case was filed. For each sued firm, we collect daily stock returns and 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from CRSP, and monthly market 




 According to the SCAC, in an IPO laddering case, plaintiffs typically allege that the underwriters of IPO 
shares engaged in undisclosed tactics in connection with allocations of portions of a firm’s IPO, and 
required tie-in purchases of additional stock in the aftermarket at escalating prices. Analyst cases are 
defined as lawsuits in which plaintiffs allege that brokerage firm analysts falsely provided favorable 
coverage for certain firms. In mutual fund cases, plaintiffs allege that the practice of timing and late trading 
in funds violated federal securities laws. In all of these cases, plaintiffs generally do not allege that the 
involved firm whose shares were traded engaged in any wrongdoing. Therefore, these cases are 
distinguishable from the large majority of lawsuits in all SCAC database. 
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capitalization and market-to-book ratios from Compustat. 
We construct an insider trading dataset from the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) 
provided by Thomson Reuters, which captures all U.S. insider holding and trading 
activity as reported on SEC Forms 3, 4, and 5. From IFDF, we obtain insider transactions 
data from 1996 to 2009. Following Seyhun (1988), we delete all duplicate, amended, and 
inconsistent transactions from our data set. In addition, we exclude transactions involving 
fewer than 100 shares since they are unlikely to represent information-related trading. 
Finally, we also exclude options exercises since they are likely to be related to employee 
compensation packages that should be less affected by insider information. We then 
merge our litigation dataset with the insider trading dataset. We require that the sued firm 
continuously traded during the 60 months prior to a lawsuit filing and had at least one 
insider transaction between 60 months before and 24 months after the lawsuit filing. The 
resulting sample consists of 534 lawsuits for which we can track insider trades. 
 
3.2.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 543 securities class action lawsuits in 
our final sample. Following Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Field, Lowry, and Shu 
(2005), we classify the sample into five industries: regulated, financial, technology, retail 
and others.
 4
 Panel A provides information on the number of securities class action 
                                                        
4 We categorize sued firms with a four-digit SIC code in the range 4000-4811, 4814-4898, and 
4900-4999 as being in a regulated industry; firms with a four-digit SIC code between 6000 and 
6999 as being in the financial industry; firms with a four-digit SIC code including 2833-2836, 
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lawsuits across the different industries. It shows that the technology industry has the 
highest securities class action lawsuit filing rate in the full sample while the filing rate in 
the financial industry increases significantly and is highest in 2008. The regulated and 
retail industries have a consistently lower filing rate over the sample period. Sorting by 
SIC code, we find that the number of filings is highest in Computer and Data Processing 
Services. The 12 listed industries, mainly including technology, financial and 
pharmaceutical firms, account for nearly one-third of the sample, and the remaining 207 
industries account for two-thirds of the sample. Not surprisingly, this suggests that the 
filing rate is rather high in certain industries, such as in the technology and financial 
services sector. A higher level of uncertainty about future prospects may contribute to a 
higher rate of lawsuits in the technology industry. Since the financial industry has direct 
relations with customers, nonperformance or questionable practices are more likely to be 
discovered, leading to more securities class action lawsuits in the financial industry 
(Gande and Lewis (2009)). Moreover, our results show that the credit turmoil beginning 
in 2007 caused a significant increase in SCA lawsuits in the financial industry.  
Panel B provides information about the length of the class period and of the interval 
between the end of the class period and the lawsuit filing date (the litigation interval). It 
shows that the mean length of the class period is 528 days, the median is 315 days, the 
minimum is 0 days, and the maximum is 2,310 days. The mean litigation interval is 105 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3571, 3572, 3575, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825-3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 
4812, 4813, 4899, 7370-7375 or 7377-7379 as being in the technology industry; and firms with a 
four-digit SIC code between 5200 and 5961 as being in the retail industry. 
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days, along with a median of 25 days, a one-fourth percentile of 7 days and a three-fourth 
percentile of 99 days. 
Panel C provides information about the types of securities class action lawsuits 
represented in our sample. Following Bhagat et al. (1998) and Bajaj et al. (2000), we 
identify nine distinct lawsuit categories by allegation type. Some firms are accused of 
more than one violation of the securities laws. The total number of lawsuit allegations 
reported in Panel C (831) thus exceeds the total number of lawsuits in our sample (534). 
Categorizing lawsuits by allegation type allows us to examine whether insiders can 
anticipate certain types of lawsuits better than other types. Insiders are more likely to 
increase sales of shares prior to the filings of certain types of lawsuits if they are able to 
forecast the lawsuits better. Categorizing lawsuits also allows us to examine whether 
certain groups of insiders can anticipate certain types of lawsuits better than other groups. 
For example, insiders in leading financial and accounting positions may be better able to 
foresee lawsuits alleging violation of GAAP standards, while CEOs may be better 
positioned to foresee lawsuits alleging a failure to disclose existing business problems. 
Table 2 presents yearly summary statistics of insider trading activities in the sued 
firms in our litigation sample. It describes the number of insider trades and the number of 
shares traded by the insiders in the sued firms during the 84-month period from 60 
months before to 24 months after the lawsuit filing in each sample year from 2000 to 
2008. Overall, there are more insider sales than insider purchases. In some years, for 
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example, 2005, 2007 and 2008, there is a significantly higher frequency of insider trading. 
However, the number of shares traded by insiders in 2005 and 2007 is not higher than 
that in other years. In 2001, the number of shares sold is largest, 1.75 billion, although the 
number of sued firms is the second smallest. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Announcement effects 
We examine the stock price impact of securities class action lawsuit announcements 
using standard event study methodology. The methodology measures the abnormal stock 
return, i.e. the difference between the actual return and the expected return, around the 
time of an event. The approach is based on the assumption that the abnormal returns are 
the result of the announcement and not some other random events occurring on the same 
day. Abnormal stock returns thus provide a unique means of associating the impact of a 
lawsuit announcement on the firm’s expected profitability in future periods (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). 
We estimate the announcement period returns of sued firms based on the market 
model. The abnormal stock return on day t is calculated by subtracting the return 
predicted by general market trends on the stock from its actual return on that day, as in 
the following formula: 




itAR = abnormal return for firm i on day t, 
itR = realized return for firm i on day t, 
,i i  = market model parameter estimates of firm i, and 
Rmt = return on the equally-weighted or value-weighted CRSP market index on day t. 
The date of the event, that is, the lawsuit announcement date, is denoted as t = 0. We 
estimate the market parameters for each firm over a 500 trading day period from day -750 
to day -251 (i.e., approximately two years). Then we calculate the daily abnormal returns 
of sued firms over the period from day -250 to day 250. The abnormal returns are 
averaged across N firms on each event day to estimate an average abnormal return (AAR) 
over the period. 
Under the assumption that the returns on each day are independent and the standard 
errors are cumulative, accumulating the abnormal returns over a given window [t1, t2] 










                           (2) 
 
















We calculate CARs of sued firms over various time windows during a period of 250 days 
before and after the announcement of a lawsuit. 
The null hypothesis is that the mean abnormal stock return during the event windows 
is equal to zero. The statistical significance of CARs is estimated using the Patell 
t-statistic (Patell (1976)), assuming cross-sectional independence and time-series 
independence. Moreover, we estimate BMP t-statistics (Boehmer, Musumeci, and 
Poulsen (1991)) which account for both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in 
returns. Finally, because t-tests are based on strong assumptions about the underlying 
return distribution, we also perform a nonparametric test, the generalized sign test 
(Cowan (1992)), to ensure the robustness of our results. Brown and Warner (1985) 
suggest that there is an increase in return variance during the announcement period. 
Cowan (1992) reports that the generalized sign test is well specified for event date 
variance increases. 
 
4.2. Insider trading activities in sued firms 
To investigate insider trading patterns in sued firms around securities class action 
announcements, we examine the time series patterns in quarterly insider sales, purchases, 
and net sales during the period from 8 quarters before to 4 quarters after a lawsuit filing. 
A quarter is defined as 90 calendar days or 63 trading days. 
 
4.2.1. Measures of insider trading 
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We measure insider trading activities by considering the number of transactions (a 
trade-based measure) and the number of shares traded (a volume-based measure). On a 
trade basis, net sales are the number of sale transactions minus the number of purchase 
transactions by insiders in each interval. On a volume basis, net sales are the number of 
shares sold minus the number of shares purchased by insiders in each interval. As Kahle 
(1999) points out, trade-based measures weight each sale and purchase transaction 
equally, regardless of the number of shares traded. Moreover, the number of shares traded 
by beneficial owners in a given transaction tends to be larger, but the trades are less likely 
to be information-driven than those by management. Therefore, examining the buy vs. 
sell decisions made by insiders may be more informative than the number of shares or 
dollar amounts they traded. We thus start our empirical analysis by focusing on the 
number of transactions in examining insider trading trends in sued firms around the 
lawsuit filings. In addition, to ensure that our results are robust across different estimation 
methods, we also examine the number of shares traded by insiders in sued firms. 
 
4.2.2. Abnormal insider trading activities 
Insiders in sued firms are expected to trade in anticipation of stock price movements 
around lawsuit filings. We focus on measures of abnormal insider trading activities, 
defined as actual insider trading activities minus expected insider trading activities. 
Expected insider trading activities are measured as the quarterly average insider trading 
activities in sued firms during a 12-quarter period beginning 20 quarters and ending 8 
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quarters prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. We argue that the expected insider 
trading activities are not related to any lawsuit filings. We examine actual quarterly 
average abnormal insider sales, purchases, and net sales during the period from 8 quarters 
before to 4 quarters after the lawsuit filing. Inferences drawn from differences in mean 
insider trading may be attributable to factors other than the lawsuit filing. To ensure that 
our results are not biased, we control for differences in the trading by each insider group 
during the pre-event (i.e. estimation) period and consider other possible factors that could 
influence insider trading activities around the lawsuit filing in a multivariate regression 
analysis. 
 
4.2.3. Categorizing insider trades by insider roles 
Using the IFDF definition of insider roles, we form two insider groups, i.e. managers, 
and non-managing insiders. In addition, we divide managers into (1) top-level vs. 
low-level managers, and (2) financial vs. non-financial managers. Managers are defined 
as all corporate officers who are in charge of principal business units, divisions or 
functions, and any other person who performs a policy-making function (Bettis, Coles, 
and Lemmon, 2000). Non-managing insiders include the board of directors (besides the 
chairman), committee members, beneficial owners and all other insiders excluding 
corporate officers. Top-level managers consist of the chairman of the board, the president 
(if applicable), the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief operating officer (COO), and 
the chief financial officer (CFO). Low-level managers consist of all managing insiders 
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except top-level managers. Financial managers include the firm’s CFO, the controller and 
the treasurer. Non-financial managers include all managing insiders except financial 
managers (a detailed description of our insider categorization based on the IFDF 
relationship codes is provided in the Appendix). The six groups of insiders allow us to 
perform three pairwise comparison tests among insiders: managers vs. non-managing 
insiders; top-level vs. low-level managers; and financial vs. non-financial managers. Each 
grouping consists of two mutually exclusive pairs. The trades by the six groups of 
insiders are separated into six subsamples of insider trading data. In our subsequent 
analysis, we will compare the trades between each pair of insiders to explore whether 
there are any apparent differences in the information content of the trades by each group 
and in each group’s trading patterns over time. 
 
4.2.4. Factors influencing insider trading 
Our regression analysis controls for a variety of factors that have been shown to 
influence insider trading in prior research. Firm size controls for differences in insider 
trading between small and large firms. Large firms may have more insiders and thus 
more insider trades than small firms. Seyhun (1986) shows that the ratio of insider 
purchases to sales in NYSE/AMEX traded firms is inversely related to firm size. 
Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders in large firms trade more actively 
and sell more than they purchase. However, Kahle (2000) shows that abnormal insider 
sales and percent sales (defined as the ratio of sales to sales plus purchases) are 
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negatively related to firm size. She suggests that insiders in large firms may be subject to 
more restrictive corporate policies and greater SEC scrutiny, and that large firms may 
have less information asymmetries and thus less information-based insider trading. We 
further employ the market-to-book ratio to identify overvalued stocks (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). Following Rozeff and Zaman (1998), insiders tend to 
purchase stock when the market-to-book ratio is low and sell when the market-to-book 
ratio is high. Therefore, we expect to find more insider sales in firms with high 
market-to-book ratios. The volatility of stock returns is often used to proxy for a firm’s 
risk. When a firm is riskier, insiders in the firm may trade more frequently to diversify 
their wealth and reduce their holdings in the firm. Thus, firms with a high level of 
volatility should have more insider trades. The industry classification of a firm may also 
affect the insider trading activities in the firm. Firms in regulated industries tend to have 
less insider trading since they are subject to more regulations and have fewer information 
asymmetries. Comparably, firms in industries with a higher level of uncertainty may 
exhibit more insider trades. 
It is worth noting that securities class action lawsuits are frequently preceded by 
significant stock price drops, often caused by the disclosure of negative information at the 
end of the class period. Niehaus and Roth (1999) and Iqbal, Shetty, and Wang (2007) 
show that there are no significant abnormal insider sales in sued firms before the end of 
the class period. On the other hand, Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1986) suggest that the price 
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drop that is frequently observed at the end of the class period (which often coincides with 
a negative event such as an earnings restatement) may lead to a decline in insider sales or 
an increase in insider purchases after the class period. Moreover, the anticipation of 
potential litigation by insiders may be associated with an increase in insider sales or a 
decline in insider purchases after the end of the class period. As shown in our descriptive 
sample, the length of the interval between the end of the class period and the lawsuit 
filing varies from 0 days to 1,091 days, with an average of 105 days. Although we do not 
attempt to explore insider trading activities related to the disclosure of negative 
information, we will consider its possible effect on insider trading patterns around lawsuit 
filings. 
In addition, we include a series of dummy variables that identify the type of 
allegation in our regression function. This allows us to examine whether insiders can 
forecast certain types of lawsuits better than other types. If insiders have a large 
information advantage for some types of lawsuits, we would expect to see more frequent 
insider trading prior to the announcements of these lawsuits. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we first examine the short-term effects of securities class action 
announcements on the sued firms’ stock performance. Then, we investigate the trends in 
insider trading activities in sued firms within a period from 8 quarters before to 4 quarters 
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after the lawsuits filings. In addition, we examine and compare the trading patterns by 
different types of insiders. Finally, we focus on the relation between a firm’s stock price 
performance and abnormal insider trading.  
 
5.1. Abnormal stock price performance around lawsuit filings  
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the average abnormal returns (AARs) 
within a period of 250 trading days (about 360 calendar days) before and after the 
announcement of a securities class action lawsuit. We observe a negative AAR of -1.00% 
on day 0, the day on which the lawsuit is announced. Moreover, we observe that AARs 
are consistently negative during the 14 days prior to a lawsuit filing (all AARs are 
significant at the 0.1% confidence level), with a minimum of -1.75% on day -4, 
suggesting that the lawsuit filings do not hit the market by surprise. While the lawsuit 
filings cause a significant price decline on the announcement day, they are preceded by 
several days of declines. After the announcement, we also observe significant and 
negative AARs on day 1 and day 2.  
Table 3 provides information on the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
sued firms over different event windows during the period (-250, +250). We observe a 
significant negative CAR of -3.20% over the standard (−1, +1) window. The CARs in 
longer windows, for example, (−5, −1), (−20, −1) and (−60, −1), also show losses that are 
significant at the 0.1% level. Overall, our results suggest that sued firms already 
experience a price drop of approximately 41.69% during the 250 trading days prior to a 
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lawsuit filing. The chicken vs. egg question of whether the stock price losses cause the 
firm to be sued or whether the stock price losses are, at least in part, related to investor 
anticipation of an impending lawsuit is difficult to answer. In either case, however, our 
results show that lawsuit filings tend to be associated with significant wealth losses. 
In the context of our study, we hypothesize that at least part of the pre-announcement 
price decline may be related to the presence of informed traders or a leakage of 
information about a forthcoming lawsuit to market participants before the announcement 
date. In addition, since many securities class action lawsuits are triggered by the 
disclosure of materially negative information, investors may partially anticipate a 
potential lawsuit once a firm restates, for example, its prior earnings. On the other hand, 
increased sales by insiders may put some selling pressure on the stock and may send a 
negative signal to other investors who may reduce their holdings as well. In addition, as 
shown in our descriptive statistics, the interval between the last day of the class period 
and the lawsuit filing date has a median of 25 days. Therefore, the pre-announcement 
price decline may at least partially be caused by a possible overlap of the 
pre-announcement period and the class action period. As noted earlier, it is impossible to 
determine in hindsight what may have caused the pre-announcement stock price decline 
in each case. We do not attempt to investigate this issue further in the paper. Rather our 
subsequent analysis focuses on insider trading behavior prior to the lawsuit filings, plus, 




5.2. Time series patterns in insider trading around lawsuits filings 
In this section, we examine insider trading activities in sued firms during the period 
from 8 quarters before to 4 quarters after lawsuits filings. Table 4 provides information 
on the expected insider trading activities by different types of insiders in sued firms. As 
defined earlier, our estimates of expected insider trading activities are captured by the 
quarterly average insider sales, purchases, and net sales in sued firms from 20 quarters to 
8 quarters before the announcement of a lawsuit. Overall, insiders are net sellers, with 
10.22 net sales transactions and 579,390 net sold shares on average. Based on these 
estimates of “normal” insider trading during our estimation period, we then examine 
whether actual insider trading activities during our event window are significantly 
different from their expected level that we observed during the estimation window. Table 
5, 6, and 7 provide information on the actual insider trading activities in selected intervals 
during the period from 8 quarters before to 4 quarters after the lawsuit filing. 
Table 5 first provides an overview of insider trading activities around lawsuit filings. 
It presents the proportion of sued firms that have at least one insider trade and the 
proportion of sued firms with insider sales, purchases, and net sale transactions in 
selected intervals. The proportion of sued firms with at least one insider trade is 
consistent from 7 quarters to 1 quarter before the announcement of a lawsuit, at around 
72%. In the last quarter prior to the lawsuit filing, it drops to 64.53%. On a monthly basis, 
the proportion declines consistently in the three months prior to lawsuit filings. This trend 
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is accompanied by a consistently declining proportion of sued firms with insider sales, 
purchases as well as net sales. Basically, the results indicate a trend that insiders reduce 
trades before the announcement of a lawsuit on average. The number of sued firm with 
insider trades drops before lawsuit filings although insiders in some sued firms may 
increase their trades. After lawsuit filings, the frequency of insider trades in sued firms 
increases gradually, but remains lower than that before lawsuit filings. 
Table 6 provides information on the number of insider trades and abnormal insider 
trades in sued firms around lawsuits filings. We present information on the average 
number of insider sales and purchases per firm in each interval. We calculate abnormal 
insider trading activities (sales, purchases, and net sales) defined as actual insider trading 
minus expected insider trading. We also report whether abnormal insider trading is 
significantly different from zero. The table presents the results for all insiders in Panel A; 
for managers in Panel B; for non-managing insiders in Panel C; for top-level managers in 
Panel D; for low-level managers in Panel E; for financial managers in Panel F; and for 
non-financial managers in Panel G. 
  As shown in Panel A of Table 6, insider sales do not change noticeably although 
insider purchases increase significantly in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a 
lawsuit. However, insider sales drop noticeably in the last month prior to the 
announcement. Meanwhile, insider purchases increase greatly compared with the 
purchases in the previous two months. Both abnormal insider sales and purchases are 
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positive and significant in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Actual 
net sales are significantly different from their expected level with the difference being 
significant at the 1% significant level. For managers, however, insider purchases do not 
increase noticeably and abnormal insider purchases are not significantly different from 
zero in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Actual net sales are 
significantly different from their expected level, at the 5% confidence level. For 
non-managing insiders, there are significant abnormal insider sales and purchases, but 
there are no significant abnormal net sales. Interestingly, for top-level managers, insider 
sales as well as abnormal insider sales increase noticeably in the last quarter prior to the 
announcement of a lawsuit while insider purchases do not change a lot and abnormal 
insider purchases are not significant. Meanwhile, abnormal net sales are significant and 
higher than those in the previous two quarters, i.e. during the event windows (-270, -180) 
and (-180, -90). For low-level managers, there are no significant abnormal sales, 
purchases or net sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. For 
financial managers, there are no significant abnormal sales, purchases or net sales either 
in the last quarter or in prior quarters before the announcement of a lawsuit. For 
non-financial managers, there are significant abnormal sales and net sales, but no 
abnormal purchases in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Although 
different types of insiders demonstrate different trading patterns, they all have positive 
abnormal net sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. After the 
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announcement, all groups of insiders have negative abnormal net sales. For 
non-managing insiders and low-level managers, abnormal net sales become negative in 
the last month prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. However, all negative abnormal 
net sales are statistically insignificant. After the announcement, all groups of insiders 
have negative abnormal net sales. 
Similarly, Table 7 provides information on the average number of shares sold and 
purchased by insiders, and the abnormal number of shares sold, purchased and net sold 
by insiders in each interval. From the results in Table 7, we do not find significant 
abnormal sales, purchases or net sales in our full insider sample, or in our subsamples of 
insiders in management and non-management positions in the last quarter or even earlier 
before the announcement of a lawsuit. For top-level managers, we find positive abnormal 
net sales, which are significant at the 5% confidence level, in the last quarter prior to the 
announcement of a lawsuit. For non-financial managers, we find positive but 
insignificant abnormal net sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. 
For the other groups of insiders, abnormal net sales are negative but statistically 
insignificant. After the announcement, all groups of insiders display negative abnormal 
net sales. Abnormal net sales in other groups except in the all insider and non-managing 
insider group are statistically significant. The results in Table 6 and 7 show that insiders 
tend to engage more frequently in sale rather than purchase transactions (resulting in an 
increase in the number of net sales transactions) although the number of shares traded 
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does not necessarily change accordingly. Instead, the number of shares net sold by 
insiders, except by top-level managers, is smaller than expected. 
 
5.3. Comparison of abnormal net sales by different types of insiders 
The above analysis of insider trading activity for the full sample and our six 
subsamples, which only comprise trades by certain types of insiders, both ensures the 
robustness of our results and allows for some interesting comparisons between the 
sub-groups. Specifically, we compare abnormal net sales between managers and 
non-managing insiders, between top-level managers and low-level managers, and 
between financial managers and non-financial managers. Table 8 and 9 present equality 
tests for a comparison of abnormal net sales among these pairs of insiders, on a trade 
basis and volume basis, respectively. We use two-sample t-tests to test for the 
significance of differences in means and Kruskal-Wallis median tests to test for the 
significance of differences in medians between each pair of groups. Median tests have the 
advantage of being more robust to outliers and extreme observations. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the mean number of abnormal net sales by managers 
is larger than that by non-managing insiders but the difference is not statistically 
significant in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Meanwhile, there is 
no significant difference in the median number of abnormal net sales between the two 
groups until two months prior to the announcement. After the announcement, the 
difference in the median is also statistically significant. Form Panel B, we observe that 
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the mean number of abnormal net sales by top managers is larger than that by low-level 
managers but the difference is statistically insignificant before or after the announcement 
of a lawsuit. The difference in the median is statistically significant from two months 
before to three months after the announcement. In the comparison between financial and 
non-financial managers in Panel C, we find significant differences in the mean and 
median number of abnormal net sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a 
lawsuit. The mean number of abnormal net sales by financial managers is negative in the 
two quarters before the announcement while that by non-financial managers is negative 
only in the last months before the announcement. 
In Table 9, we can observe noticeable difference in the mean number of abnormal net 
sales between managers and non-managing insiders. In the last quarter prior to the 
announcement of a lawsuit, managers exhibit positive abnormal net sales while 
non-managing insiders have negative abnormal net sales. Interestingly, we find a 
distinctively high positive mean number of abnormal net sales by top-level managers in 
the last quarter prior to the announcement. Meanwhile, the mean number of abnormal net 
sales by low-level managers noticeably declines in the last quarter prior to the 
announcement. However, there is no statistically significant difference in the mean or 
median number of abnormal net sales between top-level managers and low-level 
managers before or after the announcement. For financial and non-financial managers, 
the difference in the mean number of abnormal net sales is insignificant before the 
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announcement but significant after the announcement.  
Overall, before the announcement, we do not find any significant differences in the 
trade-based or volume-based mean abnormal net sales between top-level managers and 
low-level managers before the announcement of a lawsuit. The difference in the 
trade-based mean abnormal net sales between managers and non-managing insiders is not 
significant on a quarterly basis, but the difference in the median number of abnormal net 
sales becomes significant in the last two months before the announcement. The difference 
in volume-based abnormal net sales between managers and non-managing insiders is 
significant at the 5% significant level. In particular, we find that managers and top-level 
managers exhibit positive trade-based and volume-based abnormal net sales while 
non-managing insiders and low-level managers exhibit negative volume-based abnormal 
net sales in the last quarter before the announcement of a lawsuit. For financial and 
non-financial managers, we find a significant difference in trade-based abnormal net sales 
but an insignificant difference in volume-based abnormal net sales. After the 
announcement, the difference in the median number of abnormal net sales is significant 
for nearly all comparisons except the comparison of the volume-based abnormal net sales 
between top-level managers and low-level managers. 
 
5.4. Univariate analysis 
To provide some intuition for the variables we use in our subsequent regression 
analysis, we perform a series of univariate tests in which we examine whether mean and 
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median CARs and abnormal net sales differ across various subsamples of our dataset. We 
construct subsamples based on various factors that characterize the sued firm or the lawsuit. 
We distinguish between small and large firms (based on the sued firms’ market 
capitalization), between firms with high and low market-to-book ratios, between firms 
with high and low volatility, between firms in the technology industry and non-technology 
industry, and between accounting-related and non-accounting-related lawsuits. To provide 
a preliminary examination of CARs, we also distinguish between firms with net abnormal 
sales and firms with net abnormal purchases (on both a volume basis and trade basis) in the 
last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. We choose a (-5, 0) event window to 
capture a sued firm’s CAR. The findings are presented in Table 10. In addition, to provide 
a preliminary examination of abnormal net sales, we also distinguish between firms with 
positive abnormal stock returns (stock price runups) and firms with negative abnormal 
stock returns (stock price declines) at the end of the class period. The findings are 
presented in Table 11. 
From Table 10, we observe that firm characteristics except for the market-to-book 
ratio explain little of the differences in CARs. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
tend to have larger drops in stock prices when they are sued in a securities class action. 
While firms with higher a market-to-book ratio have average CARs of -8.87%, firms with 
lower a market-to-book ratio have average CARs of -5.74%. The type of allegation, a 
factor that pertains directly to lawsuits, provides interesting insights into the reason why 
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investors react differently to various types of lawsuits. We observe that 
accounting-related lawsuits cause significantly larger price declines (-12.43%) than 
non-accounting-related lawsuits (-5.07%). This suggests that investors may incorporate 
the heightened risk of large legal liability claims in accounting-related cases into their 
trading decisions. We also observe a significant difference in the CARs between firms 
with abnormal net sales and firms with abnormal net purchases. In particular, the stock 
price reaction (-10.08%) for firms with abnormal net sales is significantly larger than for 
firms with abnormal net purchases (-5.83%). This suggests that in - line with the 
signaling model of insider trading of John and Mishra (1990) - investors may take insider 
trading activities into consideration when reacting to a lawsuit filing. When insider sales 
prior to the announcement of an event are highest, announcement day returns should be 
most negative since announcement day returns are assumed to reflect information 
conveyed by insider trading activities. 
From Table 11, we observe that differences in firm size are associated with a 
significant difference in median volume-based abnormal net sales, suggesting that large 
firms tend to have lower abnormal net sales. Other firm characteristics are not associated 
with any significant differences in either trade-based or volume-based abnormal net sales. 
In addition, the type of allegations and the abnormal stock return at the end of the class 
period explain little of the difference in abnormal net sales. However, although the 
difference is not statistically significant, firms with positive abnormal stock returns at the 
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end of the class period have much higher abnormal net sales than firms with negative 
abnormal stock returns. 
 
5.5. Regression analysis 
Because univariate analyses only allow us to examine the impact of one factor at a 
time without controlling for changes in other variables, we estimate a series of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions for CARs and for abnormal insider trades against a 
variety of variables that characterize the lawsuits and the sued firms. For CARs, the 
following regression model is estimated: 
(4) 
For abnormal insider trading, the following regression model is estimated: 
   (5) 
where  
CARi = Cumulative abnormal return of the sued firm during the (-5, 0) event window, 
AITi = Abnormal insider trading (sales, purchases, or net sales) in the last quarter prior to 
a lawsuit filing. 
Sizei = Market capitalization of the sued firm one month prior to the lawsuit filing, 
MBi = Market-to-book ratio of the sued firm one month prior to the lawsuit filing, 




Indmi = Industry dummies (m = 1: Regulated; 2: Financial; 3: Technology; 4: Retail; 5: 
others), 
LSni = Allegation type dummies (n = 1: IPO-related; 2: Misleading or false statements 
(General); 3: Failure to disclose material adverse information and known risks about the 
firm’s future (including overoptimistic forecasts); 4: Failure to disclose existing business 
problems and misrepresentations about financial conditions; 5: Artificially inflated 
financial results (requiring revenue restatements); 6: Improper accounting practices and 
violations of GAAP, improper revenue recognition and improper sales practices; 7: 
Fraudulent transactions (including Enron-related); 8: Illegal insider trading), and 
ANSi = Abnormal net sales dummy. The variable equals one if there are net sales in the 
quarter prior to the lawsuit filing, and zero otherwise. 
Reti = Abnormal stock return at the end of the class period. 
In Table 12, we present results for four regressions in which we regress CARs over 
the (-5, 0), (-10, 0), (-20, 0) and (-30, 0) event windows against different subsets of 
variables as shown in Equation (4). To test for possible multicollinearity among our 
regressors, we calculate the variance inflation factors for each variable. While the 
variance inflation factors for some of the variables are high (> 5.0), our inferences are not 
significantly affected if we exclude them.  
Our findings are quite consistent with the results from our univariate analysis. We 
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observe that the sued firms’ characteristics do not have a great influence on CARs. 
However, firm size has a positive relationship with CARs, albeit it is only significant 
during the (-30, 0) event window. This indicates that large firms tend to experience 
smaller stock price drops than small firms when they are sued in a securities class action. 
Although positive, we observe that the coefficient on firm size is insignificant for CARs 
over the (-5, 0), (-10, 0) and (-20, 0) event windows. The market-to-book ratio is 
inversely related to CARs over the four examined event windows. The volatility of sued 
firms’ stock returns is positively related to CARs over the (-5, 0) and (-10, 0) event 
window, but negatively related to CARs over (-20, 0) and (-30, 0) event windows. 
However, all the relations are statistically insignificant. In addition, we employ four 
dummy variables that distinguish between the industries of sued firms. The dummy 
variable, IND4, indentifying the retail industry, is significantly positively related to the 
firm’s CARs over the (-10, 0) and (-20, 0) event windows, suggesting that firms in the 
retail industry experience smaller stock price drops when they are sued. 
Similarly, we differentiate between lawsuit allegations of lawsuits by employing 
eight dummy variables as explained earlier. The resulting regression coefficients 
represent CAR differences relative to the excluded category, i.e. other or unknown types 
of allegations. The dummy variables LT5 and LT6 indentify accounting-related 
allegations (which were significant in our univariate tests). We observe that the 
coefficient on LT5 is significant and negative for CARs over the (-5, 0), (-10, 0) and (-30, 
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0) event windows, and the coefficient on LT6 is negative and significant for CARs over 
the (-10, 0) event window. For other allegation type dummies, we do not observe that they 
have a statistically significant relationship with CARs. The results suggest that lawsuits 
involving artificially inflated financial results cause significant larger stock price declines 
than other types of lawsuits. On the other hand, abnormal net sales now become 
insignificant in our regression model (yet retain their negative sign) although they are 
negative and significant in our univariate tests. The results suggest that increased net 
sales prior to the announcement of a lawsuit do not cause significant drops in the stock 
price of sued firms. 
In Table 13, we present results for six regressions in which we regress abnormal 
insider sales, purchases and net sales (on a trade basis and volume basis) in the last 
quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit against different subsets of variables as 
shown in Equation (5). Our discussion focuses on regression results for trade-based 
insider trading activities. We observe that sued firms’ characteristics do not cause 
significant differences in abnormal sales, purchases or net sales. Although insignificant, 
the coefficient on firm size is negative for trade-based abnormal sales, purchases and net 
sales. This is consistent with the findings by Kahle (1999) who argues that insiders in 
larger firms trade less around specific event because they are subject to more SEC 
scrutiny. In addition, large firms should have fewer information asymmetries and thus 
less information-based insider trades. The market-to-book ratio, usually used to identify 
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overvalued stocks, is positively related to abnormal sales, purchases and net sales. The 
volatility of stock returns is negatively related to abnormal sales and net sales, however. 
In addition, we observe that sued firms in the regulated industry (identified by LT1) and 
in the technology industry (identified by LT3) have few abnormal insider sales and net 
sales than firms in other industries. On the other hand, firms in the retail industry have 
additional 25.69 net sale transactions compared to firms in other industries. 
The coefficient on allegation type dummy, LT2, indicating misleading or false 
statements (general), is significantly negatively related to trade-based abnormal net sales. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the allegation type dummy, LT3, indicating failure to 
disclose material adverse information, is significantly positively related to trade-based 
abnormal sales and net sales. The results indicate that - compared to other types of 
lawsuits - lawsuits alleging misleading or false statements significantly reduce net sales 
by 16.99 while lawsuits alleging failure to disclose material adverse information 
significantly increase net sales by 15.53. Other types of lawsuits do not cause significant 
differences in abnormal net sales. In addition, we observe that the abnormal stock return 
at the end of the class period is not significantly related to abnormal sales, purchase or net 
sales.  
 
5.6. Abnormal insider trading and CARs 
In Table 6, we show that insiders increase their net sales transactions before the 
announcement of a lawsuit. Especially, top-level managers have significant positive 
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trade-based and volume-based abnormal net sales. If insiders increase sales in 
anticipation of a lawsuit, there would be a positive relation between abnormal net sales 
prior to the announcement of a lawsuit and abnormal stock returns. To further examine 
the effect of the lawsuit filing on insider trading activities in the sued firm, we perform an 
OLS regression of abnormal net insider sales on CARs over a (-5, 0) event window, 
controlling for other factors that characterize the lawsuits and the sued firms. 
(6) 
where all variables are as defined earlier in Equation (4) and (5). 
In Table 14, we present results for seven regressions in which we regress abnormal 
net sales by all insiders, managers, non-managing insiders, top-level managers, low-level 
managers, financial managers and non-financial managers, respectively, against the 
CARs over the (-5, 0) event window and other different subsets of variables as shown in 
Equation (6). The results for regressions of trade-based and volume-based abnormal net 
sales are reported in Panel A and B, respectively.  
From Panel A, we observe that there is no significant relation between abnormal net 
sales and abnormal stock returns for all insiders and six groups of insiders. The coefficient 
on the CARs is positive for all insiders, managers, top-level managers, and financial 
managers while the coefficient on CAR is negative for non-managing insiders, low-level 
managers, and non-financial managers. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis that 
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insiders increase net sales in anticipation of a stock price drop on the announcement of a 
lawsuit or managers may net sell more aggressively than non-managing insiders. Instead, 
the results indicate that all insiders, managers, top-level managers, and financial 
managers are more likely to reduce their net sales transactions while stock prices drop 
more greatly. Moreover, non-managing insiders are more likely to increase sale 
transactions than managers before a lawsuit filing. As shown in Table 6, net sales in the 
last quarter prior to a lawsuit filing are significantly higher than normal for all insiders, 
managers, top-level managers, and non-financial managers. Although insiders increase 
net sales transactions before the announcement of a lawsuit, the abnormal net sales in the 
last quarter prior to the announcement are not negatively related to the abnormal stock 
returns. Moreover, from the results in Table 6, we observe that the abnormal net sales in 
the last quarter before the announcement of a lawsuit are less than those in earlier periods, 
i.e. two quarters before the lawsuit filing. Therefore, these results do not show that 
insiders increase net sales in anticipation of a stock price drop on the announcement of a 
lawsuit although insiders, especially managers, have higher net sale than normal before 
the announcement. Otherwise, it is possible that litigation risk deters insiders, especially 
managers, from increasing sales transactions even if they know the bad stock 
performance resulted from a lawsuit filing.  
However, from Panel B we observe that the coefficient on volume-based abnormal 
net sales is negative for all insiders and the six subgroups of insiders. The coefficient is 
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statistically significant for managers, top-level managers, and non-financial managers. 
The results suggest that managers may increase the number of shares sold in anticipation 
of negative stock returns on the announcement of a lawsuit. Moreover, top-level 
managers increase their net sales greatly by 671,195.8 shares as abnormal stock returns 
decline by 1%. Comparably, although negative, the relation between abnormal net sales 
and abnormal stock returns is not statistically significant for low-level managers. As 
shown in Table 7, only abnormal net sales by top-level managers are statistically 
significant in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. The regression 
results on volume-bases net sales are partially consistent with our hypothesis. We find 
that managers in sued firms which experience the worst abnormal stock returns net sell 
most shares in the quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Specifically, only 
abnormal net sales by top-level managers are inversely related to abnormal stock returns. 
There is no such relation for non-managing insiders or low-level managers.  
In addition, we observe significant relations between abnormal net sales and certain 
types of allegations. As shown in Panel A, the coefficient on LT1, indicating IPO-related 
cases, is significant and positive for managers, low-level managers and non-financial 
managers. The coefficient on LT2, indicating misleading or false statements (general), is 
significant and negative for all insiders and non-managing insiders. The results indicate 
that insiders have more trade-based abnormal net sales prior to a lawsuit filing when the 
case is IPO-related, and have less abnormal net sales when the case is related to 
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misleading or false statements. On the other hand, from Panel B, we observe that the 
coefficient on LT3, indicating failure to disclose material adverse information, is 
significant and positive for managers, top-level managers and non-financial managers. 
The coefficient on LT8, indicating illegal insider trading, is also significant and positive 
for managers, top-level managers and non-financial managers. The results indicate that 
insiders, especially top-level managers, tend to have more volume-based abnormal net 
sales prior to a lawsuit filing when the case is related to failure to disclose material 
adverse information or illegal insider trading. The results may suggest that insiders have a 
higher information advantage for certain types of lawsuits. Especially, the results show 
that top-level managers engage in more net selling when anticipating negative abnormal 
stock returns and may net sell more aggressively when the lawsuit is related to failure to 
disclose material adverse information or illegal insider trading. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Securities class action lawsuits have a negative impact on the stock performance of 
sued firms when they are announced. We hypothesize that lawsuits are not entirely 
unexpected for insiders and examine insider trading activities around the lawsuit filings. 
Using a sample of 543 securities class action lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2008, we 
show that insiders tend to increase trade-based net sales before the announcement of a 
lawsuit and reduce trade-based net sales after the announcement. We divide insiders into 
managers and non-managing insiders and find that managers have positive trade-based 
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abnormal net sales but non-managing insiders have negative trade-based abnormal net 
sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. Moreover, we divide 
managers into top-level and low-level managers and find that top-level managers have 
positive trade-based abnormal net sales but non-managing insiders have negative 
trade-based abnormal net sales in the last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. 
Especially, only top-level managers net sell significantly more shares than normal in the 
last quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit. We also find that managers have more 
volume-based abnormal net sales than non-managing insiders in the last quarter prior to 
the announcement of a lawsuit. 
Nevertheless, our regression results do not show a significant correlation between 
abnormal stock returns and trade-based abnormal net sales. However, our regression 
results show a negative correlation between abnormal stock returns and volume-based 
abnormal net sales by managers and top-level managers. The results suggest that 
top-level managers increase the shares net sold before the announcement of a lawsuit in 
anticipation of the stock price drop resulting from the lawsuit filing. This evidence 
supports that top-level managers may use their foreknowledge of a lawsuit to engage in 
informed trading prior to a lawsuit filing. 
In addition, we find that trade-based abnormal net sales are positively related to 
IPO-related lawsuits and negatively related to lawsuits alleging misleading or false 
statements. Volume-based abnormal net sales are positively related to lawsuits alleging 
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failure to disclose material adverse information or illegal insider trading. These results 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for securities class action lawsuits filed between 
2000 and 2008. Panel A reports the number of lawsuits across different industries by year. 
The panel employs the industry classification proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
and Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005). Panel B provides a more detailed industry breakdown 
based on four-digit SIC codes. Panel C provides information on the length of the class 
period and the ligation interval, defined as the period between the end of the class period 
and the lawsuit filing date. Panel D reports the number of lawsuits by allegation type and 
year. Following Bhagat et al. (1998) and Bajaj et al. (2000), we identify nine distinct 
allegation categories. Our sorting criteria are not exclusive, resulting in some firms being 
accused of more than one violation of the securities laws. The total number of lawsuit 
allegations reported in Panel B (831) thus exceeds the total number of lawsuits in our 
sample (543).  
 
Panel A: Number of lawsuits across different industries 
  Regulated Financial Technology Retail Other 
2000 4 3 12 1 21 
 
9.76% 7.32% 29.27% 2.44% 51.22% 
2001 1 3 17 2 19 
 
2.38% 7.14% 40.48% 4.76% 45.24% 
2002 12 10 18 1 25 
 
18.18% 15.15% 27.27% 1.52% 37.88% 
2003 6 9 20 2 28 
 
9.23% 13.85% 30.77% 3.08% 43.08% 
2004 5 15 20 6 36 
 
6.10% 18.29% 24.39% 7.32% 43.90% 
2005 1 11 21 2 28 
 
1.59% 17.46% 33.33% 3.17% 44.44% 
2006 0 7 17 3 24 
 
0.00% 13.73% 33.33% 5.88% 47.06% 
2007 1 13 17 4 25 
 
1.67% 21.67% 28.33% 6.67% 41.67% 
2008 3 27 19 3 21 
 
4.11% 36.99% 26.03% 4.11% 28.77% 
Total 33 98 161 24 227 
 













Computer and Data Processing Services (SIC 7370) 34 6.22% 
Drugs (SIC 2830) 27 4.94% 
Electronic Components and Accessories (SIC 3670) 23 4.20% 
Pharmaceutical Preparations (SIC 2834) 22 4.02% 
Security Brokers and Dealers (SIC 6211) 13 2.38% 
Communications Equipment (SIC 3660) 12 2.19% 
Electric Services (SIC 4911) 12 2.19% 
Administration of Financial Markets (SIC 6711) 10 1.83% 
National Commercial Banks (SIC 6021) 9 1.65% 
Semiconductors and Related Devices (SIC 3674) 8 1.46% 
Electric & Other Services Combined (4931) 8 1.46% 
Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurance (SIC 6331) 7 1.28% 
Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturers (3840) 7 1.28% 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (SIC 6798) 7 1.28% 
Prepackaged Software (SIC 7372) 7 1.28% 
Others (207 industries) 337 62.34% 
 
Panel C: Length of the class period and the ligation interval (in calendar time) 








25 percentile 174 
 
25 percentile 7 
75 percentile 683 
 













Panel D: Number of lawsuits by allegation type 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
IPO-Related 0 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 10 
Misleading or False Statements (General) 20 11 18 25 17 36 33 37 36 233 
Failure to Disclose Material Adverse 
Information and Known Risks about the Firm’s 
Future (Including Overoptimistic Forecasts) 
4 11 16 8 20 29 17 15 10 130 
Failure to Disclose Existing Business Problems; 
Misrepresentations about Financial Conditions 
11 5 16 16 20 17 10 19 25 139 
Artificially Inflated Financial Results 
(Including Revenue Restatements) 
9 10 8 20 19 13 10 8 9 106 
Improper Accounting Practices and Violations of 
GAAP, Improper Revenue Recognition and 
Improper Sales Practices 
7 8 20 11 16 12 18 4 3 99 
Fraudulent Transactions  
(Including Enron-Related) 
0 2 3 3 8 0 0 2 13 31 
Illegal Insider Trading 4 9 7 2 1 4 2 0 1 30 
Other or Unknown (Violation of Corporate 
Disclosure Rules, Breach of Fiduciary 
Responsibilities, etc.) 
3 4 4 5 14 8 7 4 4 53 





Table 2: Summary Statistics of Insider Trading 
 
This table presents yearly summary statistics on insider trading activities in our sample of sued firms from 2000 to 2008. We 
collect insider trading data from the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by Thomson Reuters. Following Seyhun (1988), 
we delete all duplicate, amended and inconsistent transactions, and exclude transactions involving fewer than 100 shares as 
well as options exercises. We merge the insider trading dataset with the litigation dataset in the corresponding period. We 
require that the sued firm was continuously traded during the 60 months prior to the lawsuit filing and had at least one insider 
trade transaction between 60 months before and 24 months after the lawsuit filing. The resulting sample consists of 543 
securities class action lawsuits. The table describes insider trading activities in the sued firms in each sample year. In columns 
3 and 4, we report the number of insider sales and the number of shares sold by the insiders. In columns 5 and 6, we report the 
number of insider purchases and the number of shares purchased by the insiders.  
 
Year  
Number of Firms  
with Insider Trades 
Number of Sale 
Transactions 
Number of Shares 
Sold (Million) 
Number of Purchase 
Transactions 




41 3,977 238.94 1,149 21.67 
2001  42 7,367 1,750.12 1,924 25.17 
2002  66 8,090 249.18 2,095 27.10 
2003  65 11,004 560.69 5,059 55.04 
2004 
 
82 21,305 660.22 3,403 123.27 
2005  63 36,489 415.37 4,466 25.84 
2006  51 24,231 625.56 1,434 27.12 
2007  60 31,471 469.66 1,490 23.34 
2008  73 36,868 1,104.36 2,771 111.32 
Total  543 180,802 6,074.09 23,791 439.88 
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Table 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Sued Firms 
 
This table provides information on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of sued firms, derived from the market model 
using the CRSP equally weighted index, over different event windows during a period of 250 trading days before and after the 
announcement of a lawsuit filing. The sample consists of 534 lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2008. In columns 2 and 3, we 
report the average and median CARs for the respective event windows. In columns 4, 5, and 6, we provide the results for three 
types of significance tests: the Patell t-statistic, the BMP t-statistic and the test statistic for the generalized sign test, 
respectively. The p-values for each test are provided in parentheses below the test statistics. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Number of Days  
Before/After the 
Announcement 
 Mean Median  Patell Z BMP Z Generalized Sign Z 




 (<.001)*** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (0.115) *** 
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 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (0.007) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (<.001) *** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (0.003) ** 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (0.001) 




 (<.001) *** (<.001) *** (0.009) ** 




 (0.003) ** (0.036) * (0.837) 




 (0.01) ** (-0.079) (0.584) 




 (<.001) *** (0.007) ** (0.098) 












Table 4: Expected Insider Trading Activities in Sued Firms 
 
This table provides information on expected insider trading, defined as the quarterly average insider trading in sued firms from 
20 quarters to 8 quarters before the announcements of a lawsuit filing. It presents expected insider sales, purchases and net 
selling by all insiders, as well as managers, non-managing insiders, top-level managers, low-level managers, financial 
managers and non-financial managers. For each firm, we define the number of net sale transactions as the number of sale 
transactions minus the number of purchase transactions in each interval. Similarly, the number of net sold shares for each firm is 
defined as the number of shares sold minus the number of shares purchased in each interval. In columns 2 to 4, we report the 
number of insider sale, purchase, and net sale transactions. In columns 5 to 7, we report the number of shares purchased and sold 
by insiders as well as the number of net sold shares for each interval. All missing transactions are assigned a zero value.  
 
 
 Number of insider transactions 
 














11.36 1.14 10.22  600.63 21.24 579.39 
Management  7.26 0.42 6.83  165.46 4.93 160.53 
Non-management  4.10 0.72 3.39  435.17 16.31 418.86 
Top Management  3.34 0.27 3.08  92.93 3.93 89.00 
Low Management 
 
3.92 0.16 3.76  72.53 1.00 71.53 
Financial Management  0.86 0.05 0.81  10.67 0.33 10.34 
Non-financial 
Management 





Table 5: Proportion of Sued Firms with Insider Trades around Lawsuit Filings 
 
We examine trends in insider trading activity within a period of eight quarters before to four quarters after the announcement 
of 543 securities class action lawsuits in our litigation sample. The table provides an overview of insider trading activities in 
specific intervals around a lawsuits filing. In column 2, we report the proportion of sued firm that have at least one insider 
trade. In column 3, 4, and 5, we report the proportion of sued firm with insider sales, purchase, and net sale transactions. We 
classify a firm as having net sale transactions in a particular interval if the number of shares sold by its insiders is greater than 
the number of shares purchased by its insiders during that period. 
 
Trade Interval  
Proportion of firms  
with insider trades 
Proportion of firms with 
sale transactions 
Proportion of firms 
with purchase 
transactions 
Proportion of firms 
with net sales 
(-720, -630) 
 
69.65% 59.23% 23.03% 55.76% 
(-630, -540)  72.21% 62.71% 23.40% 58.50% 
(-540, -450)  72.94% 62.89% 23.58% 58.87% 
(-450, -360)  72.76% 62.89% 23.03% 59.05% 
(-360, -270) 
 
73.49% 63.99% 22.67% 59.96% 
(-270, -180)  72.39% 62.52% 24.68% 58.14% 
(-180, -90)  71.30% 63.07% 21.94% 58.68% 
(-90, 0)  64.53% 53.20% 23.95% 48.63% 
(-90, -60)  43.69% 35.28% 12.43% 34.00% 
(-60, -30)  38.76% 32.54% 10.60% 31.08% 
(-30, 0)  29.25% 23.77% 8.04% 22.49% 
(0, 30)  29.25% 15.54% 21.76% 12.98% 
55 
 
(30, 60)  38.76% 17.55% 15.36% 15.36% 
(60, 90)  43.69% 14.08% 10.42% 13.35% 
(0, 90)  55.21% 31.44% 35.47% 26.33% 
(90, 180)  50.82% 33.64% 26.69% 29.98% 
(180, 270)  52.29% 41.50% 21.57% 36.56% 

























Table 6: Insider Trading Activities around Lawsuit Filings (Trade-Based) 
  
We examine trends in insider trading activity within a period of eight quarters before to four quarters after the announcement 
of 543 securities class action lawsuits in our litigation sample. The table presents the number of insider trades and abnormal 
insider trades in specific intervals around a lawsuits filing. In column 2 and 3, we report the average number of insider sales 
and purchases per firm during each interval. In column 4 and 5, we calculate abnormal insider sales (purchases) as actual 
insider sales (purchases) minus expected insider sales (purchases). The expected insider sales (purchases) are the mean 
quarterly insider sales (purchases) of that firm during the 3-year period beginning 5 years prior to the announcement of a 
lawsuit and ending 2 years prior to the announcement. In column 6, we calculate net sales during each period, where net sales 
are defined as the number of sale transactions minus the number of purchase transactions by insiders in each interval. We 
present results for all insiders in panel A; managers in panel B; non-managing insiders in panel C; top-level managers in panel 
D; low-level managers in panel E; financial managers in panel F; and non-financial managers in panel G. The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: All Insiders 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
19.17 5.92 7.81*** 4.78*** 3.03 
(-630, -540) 
 
20.01 1.94 8.65*** 0.80*** 7.85*** 
(-540, -450) 
 
21.75 1.40 10.38*** 0.26 10.12*** 
(-450, -360) 
 
18.80 1.27 7.44*** 0.13 7.31*** 
(-360, -270) 
 
21.97 1.69 10.61*** 0.55** 10.06*** 
(-270, -180) 
 
23.35 1.64 11.99*** 0.50* 11.49*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
20.82 1.14 9.46*** 0.00 9.46*** 
(-90, 0) 
 
20.48 3.05 9.12*** 1.91*** 7.21*** 
(-90, -60) 
 
7.54 0.61 3.75** 0.23 3.52** 
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(-60, -30)  7.18 0.82 3.39** 0.44*** 2.96* 
(-30, 0)  5.77 1.62 1.98 1.24*** 0.74 
(0, 30)  2.08 1.20 -1.71 0.82* -2.53 
(30, 60)  2.90 0.69 -0.89 0.31* -1.19 
(60, 90)  2.33 0.33 -1.46 -0.05 -1.41 
(0, 90)  7.31 2.21 -4.06 1.07*** -5.13* 
(90, 180)  7.93 1.86 -3.44 0.72*** -4.15 
(180, 270)  6.34 4.67 -5.02* 3.53*** -8.54*** 
(270, 360)  6.26 3.01 -5.10* 1.87*** -6.97*** 
 
Panel B: Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
14.54 0.26 7.29*** -0.17 7.45*** 
(-630, -540) 
 
12.27 0.37 5.02** -0.05 5.07** 
(-540, -450) 
 
12.13 0.38 4.88** -0.04 4.92** 
(-450, -360) 
 
10.31 0.29 3.05 -0.13 3.18 
(-360, -270) 
 
14.97 0.59 7.71*** 0.17 7.54*** 
(-270, -180) 
 
14.48 0.41 7.23*** -0.01 7.24*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
13.75 0.39 6.49*** -0.03 6.52*** 
(-90, 0) 
 
12.34 0.37 5.08** -0.05 5.13** 
(-90, -60) 
 
4.62 0.20 2.20* 0.06 2.14* 
(-60, -30)  4.24 0.10 1.82 -0.04 1.87 
(-30, 0)  3.47 0.07 1.05 -0.07 1.12 
(0, 30)  1.54 0.52 -0.88 0.38*** -1.26 
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(30, 60)  2.23 0.29 -0.19 0.15** -0.34 
(60, 90)  1.58 0.13 -0.84 -0.01 -0.83 
(0, 90)  5.34 0.95 -1.91 0.52*** -2.44 
(90, 180)  5.15 0.55 -2.11 0.13 -2.24 
(180, 270)  3.63 0.45 -3.63* 0.02 -3.66* 
(270, 360)  3.99 0.46 -3.26 0.04 -3.30 
 
Panel C: Non-managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
4.63 5.66 0.53 4.95*** -4.42*** 
(-630, -540) 
 
7.74 1.56 3.63*** 0.85*** 2.78** 
(-540, -450) 
 
9.61 1.02 5.51*** 0.31 5.20*** 
(-450, -360) 
 
8.50 0.98 4.39*** 0.26 4.13*** 
(-360, -270) 
 
7.00 1.10 2.90** 0.38 2.52* 
(-270, -180) 
 
8.87 1.23 4.76*** 0.52** 4.25*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
7.07 0.75 2.97** 0.03 2.94** 
(-90, 0) 
 
8.14 2.68 4.04*** 1.96*** 2.08 
(-90, -60) 
 
2.91 0.41 1.54* 0.17 1.37* 
(-60, -30)  2.94 0.72 1.57* 0.48*** 1.09 
(-30, 0)  2.29 1.55 0.93 1.31*** -0.39 
(0, 30)  0.54 0.67 -0.83 0.44*** -1.26 
(30, 60)  0.67 0.39 -0.70 0.16 -0.85 
(60, 90)  0.75 0.20 -0.62 -0.04 -0.58 
(0, 90)  1.96 1.27 -2.14 0.55** -2.69* 
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(90, 180)  2.78 1.30 -1.33 0.59** -1.91 
(180, 270)  2.72 4.22 -1.39 3.50*** -4.89*** 
(270, 360)  2.27 2.55 -1.84 1.83*** -3.67*** 
 
Panel D: Top-level managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
8.14 0.14 4.80*** -0.13 4.93*** 
(-630, -540) 
 
5.38 0.19 2.04* -0.08 2.12* 
(-540, -450) 
 
6.10 0.16 2.76** -0.11 2.86** 
(-450, -360) 
 
5.27 0.20 1.93* -0.06 1.99* 
(-360, -270) 
 
8.91 0.19 5.57*** -0.07 5.64*** 
(-270, -180) 
 
6.54 0.22 3.20*** -0.04 3.24*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
6.56 0.20 3.22*** -0.06 3.28*** 
(-90, 0) 
 
7.94 0.22 4.59*** -0.04 4.64*** 
(-90, -60) 
 
2.48 0.14 1.37** 0.05 1.32** 
(-60, -30)  2.91 0.03 1.79*** -0.05 1.85*** 
(-30, 0)  2.54 0.05 1.43** -0.04 1.47** 
(0, 30)  0.99 0.36 -0.13 0.27*** -0.40 
(30, 60)  1.60 0.15 0.49 0.06 0.43 
(60, 90)  1.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 
(0, 90)  3.61 0.55 0.27 0.29*** -0.01 
(90, 180)  2.56 0.39 -0.78 0.13 -0.91 
(180, 270)  1.47 0.29 -1.88* 0.02 -1.90* 
(270, 360)  1.24 0.30 -2.10 0.04** -2.14 
60 
 
Panel E: Low-level Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
6.40 0.12 2.48** -0.04 2.52** 
(-630, -540) 
 
6.90 0.19 2.98*** 0.03 2.95*** 
(-540, -450) 
 
6.04 0.22 2.12* 0.06* 2.06* 
(-450, -360) 
 
5.04 0.09 1.12 -0.07** 1.19 
(-360, -270) 
 
6.06 0.40 2.14* 0.24*** 1.90* 
(-270, -180) 
 
7.94 0.19 4.03*** 0.03 4.00*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
7.19 0.19 3.27*** 0.03 3.24*** 
(-90, 0) 
 
4.40 0.15 0.49 -0.01 0.50 
(-90, -60) 
 
2.14 0.06 0.83 0.01 0.82 
(-60, -30)  1.33 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 
(-30, 0)  0.93 0.02 -0.37 -0.03 -0.35 
(0, 30)  0.55 0.17 -0.75 0.11*** -0.87 
(30, 60)  0.63 0.14 -0.68 0.09*** -0.77 
(60, 90)  0.55 0.09 -0.75 0.03 -0.79 
(0, 90)  1.73 0.39 -2.19** 0.24*** -2.42** 
(90, 180)  2.59 0.16 -1.33 0.00 -1.33 
(180, 270)  2.16 0.16 -1.75 0.01 -1.76 






Panel F: Financial Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
2.47 0.04 1.61*** -0.02 1.62*** 
(-630, -540) 
 
1.08 0.02 0.22 -0.04* 0.25 
(-540, -450) 
 
0.94 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.09 
(-450, -360) 
 
0.96 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.08 
(-360, -270) 
 
1.11 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.24 
(-270, -180) 
 
1.02 0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.17 
(-180, -90) 
 
0.80 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 
(-90, 0) 
 
0.71 0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.14 
(-90, -60) 
 
0.32 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
(-60, -30)  0.34 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
(-30, 0)  0.05 0.00 -0.24 -0.02 -0.22 
(0, 30)  0.06 0.09 -0.23 0.07*** -0.30 
(30, 60)  0.04 0.05 -0.25 0.03*** -0.28 
(60, 90)  0.04 0.01 -0.25 0.00 -0.24 
(0, 90)  0.14 0.15 -0.73** 0.10*** -0.82** 
(90, 180)  0.28 0.08 -0.58* 0.03* -0.61* 
(180, 270)  0.47 0.08 -0.39 0.03 -0.42 

















Insider Net Sales 
 
 (-720, -630) 
 
12.07 0.22 5.19*** -0.15 5.34*** 
(-630, -540) 
 
11.19 0.35 4.31** -0.02 4.32** 
(-540, -450) 
 
11.19 0.34 4.31** -0.03 4.34** 
(-450, -360) 
 
9.35 0.22 2.46 -0.15 2.61 
(-360, -270) 
 
13.86 0.54 6.97*** 0.16 6.81*** 
(-270, -180) 
 
13.46 0.37 6.57*** -0.01 6.58*** 
(-180, -90) 
 
12.95 0.36 6.06*** -0.01 6.08*** 
(-90, 0) 
 
11.63 0.34 4.74** -0.03 4.78** 
(-90, -60) 
 
4.31 0.18 2.01* 0.06 1.95* 
(-60, -30)  3.90 0.09 1.60 -0.04 1.64 
(-30, 0)  3.42 0.07 1.13 -0.05 1.18 
(0, 30)  1.48 0.44 -0.81 0.31*** -1.13 
(30, 60)  2.19 0.24 -0.11 0.12** -0.22 
(60, 90)  1.54 0.12 -0.76 -0.01 -0.75 
(0, 90)  5.21 0.80 -1.68 0.43*** -2.10 
(90, 180)  4.87 0.47 -2.02 0.10 -2.12 
(180, 270)  3.15 0.37 -3.73** 0.00 -3.73** 







Table 7: Insider Trading Activities around Lawsuit Filings (Volume-Based) 
 
We examine trends in insider trading activity within a period of eight quarters before to four quarters after the announcements 
of a securities class action lawsuit. In column 2 and 3, we calculate the average number of sales and purchases per firm during 
each interval. In column 4 and 5, we calculate abnormal sales (purchases) defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected 
sales (purchases). The expected sales (purchases) are the mean quarterly sales (purchases) of that firm in the 3-year period 
beginning 5 years prior to the announcement of a lawsuit and ending 2 years prior to the announcement. In column 6, we 
calculate net sales during each period, where net sales are defined as the number of shares sold minus the number of shares 
purchased by insiders in each interval. We present results for all insiders in panel A; managers in panel B; non-managing 
insiders in panel C; top-level managers in panel D; low-level managers in panel E; financial managers in panel F; and 
non-financial managers in panel G. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: All Insiders 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
344.83 34.38 -255.80 13.14 -268.94 
(-630, -540) 
 
807.61 26.89 206.99 5.64 201.34 
(-540, -450) 
 
412.44 57.21 -188.19 35.96*** -224.15 
(-450, -360) 
 
476.56 91.94 -124.07 70.70*** -194.76 
(-360, -270) 
 
231.91 15.44 -368.72 -5.80 -362.91 
(-270, -180) 
 
277.38 24.10 -323.25 2.86 -326.11 
(-180, -90) 
 
226.31 21.27 -374.32 0.03 -374.35 
(-90, 0) 
 
257.02 16.31 -343.61 -4.94 -338.68 
(-90, -60) 
 
70.29 5.78 -129.92 -1.30 -128.62 
(-60, -30)  144.00 4.28 -56.21 -2.81 -53.40 
64 
 
(-30, 0)  42.73 6.25 -157.48 -0.83 -156.65 
(0, 30)  50.61 17.32 -149.60 10.24* -159.84 
(30, 60)  94.15 152.47 -106.06 145.39* -251.45 
(60, 90)  18.31 4.67 -181.90 -2.41 -179.50 
(0, 90)  163.06 174.46 -437.57 153.22*** -590.78 
(90, 180)  78.45 20.16 -522.18 -1.08 -521.10 
(180, 270)  419.69 32.43 -180.94 11.19 -192.13 
(270, 360)  201.57 34.64 -399.06 13.39 -412.45 
 
Panel B: Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
148.80 5.20 -16.66 0.27 -16.94 
(-630, -540) 
 
329.87 5.35 164.40*** 0.42 163.99*** 
(-540, -450) 
 
165.93 5.84 0.47 0.90 -0.43 
(-450, -360) 
 
150.20 2.21 -15.27 -2.73 -12.54 
(-360, -270) 
 
161.69 3.70 -3.77 -1.23 -2.54 
(-270, -180) 
 
197.23 2.51 31.76 -2.42 34.18 
(-180, -90) 
 
143.55 2.65 -21.91 -2.29 -19.63 
(-90, 0) 
 
167.73 1.85 2.27 -3.08 5.35 
(-90, -60) 
 
48.67 0.63 -6.48 -1.01 -5.47 
(-60, -30)  88.04 0.30 32.89 -1.34 34.23 
(-30, 0)  31.02 0.92 -24.14 -0.73 -23.41 
(0, 30)  17.52 4.55 -37.64* 2.90** -40.54* 
(30, 60)  15.87 4.14 -39.28* 2.50** -41.78* 
65 
 
(60, 90)  10.74 1.46 -44.41** -0.19 -44.22** 
(0, 90)  44.13 10.15 -121.33*** 5.22** -126.54*** 
(90, 180)  44.22 6.26 -121.24*** 1.33 -122.57*** 
(180, 270)  230.75 4.39 65.28* -0.55 65.83* 
(270, 360)  59.83 9.87 -105.63*** 4.93** -110.57*** 
 
Panel C: Non-managing insiders 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
196.03 29.18 -239.14 12.87 -252.00 
(-630, -540) 
 
477.75 21.54 42.58 5.23 37.36 
(-540, -450) 
 
246.51 51.37 -188.66 35.06*** -223.72 
(-450, -360) 
 
326.36 89.73 -108.80 73.42*** -182.22 
(-360, -270) 
 
70.22 11.74 -364.95 -4.58 -360.37 
(-270, -180) 
 
80.16 21.59 -355.01 5.28 -360.29 
(-180, -90) 
 
82.76 18.63 -352.41 2.32 -354.73 
(-90, 0) 
 
89.29 14.46 -345.88 -1.85 -344.03 
(-90, -60) 
 
21.62 5.15 -123.44 -0.29 -123.15 
(-60, -30)  55.96 3.98 -89.09 -1.46 -87.63 
(-30, 0)  11.71 5.33 -133.35 -0.11 -133.24 
(0, 30)  33.09 12.77 -111.96 7.33 -119.29 
(30, 60)  78.27 148.33 -66.78 142.89 -209.67 
(60, 90)  7.56 3.22 -137.49 -2.22 -135.27 
(0, 90)  118.93 164.31 -316.24 148.00 -464.24 
(90, 180)  34.22 13.90 -400.94 -2.41 -398.53 
66 
 
(180, 270)  188.94 28.05 -246.23 11.74 -257.96 
(270, 360)  141.74 24.77 -293.43 8.46 -301.89 
 
Panel D: Top-level managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
82.67 4.28 -10.26 0.35 -10.61 
(-630, -540) 
 
89.76 2.64 -3.17 -1.29 -1.88 
(-540, -450) 
 
99.42 5.20 6.49 1.27 5.21 
(-450, -360) 
 
96.60 1.59 3.67 -2.33 6.01 
(-360, -270) 
 
99.91 2.39 6.98 -1.54 8.53 
(-270, -180) 
 
124.98 1.25 32.05 -2.68 34.73 
(-180, -90) 
 
82.08 1.58 -10.85 -2.35 -8.50 
(-90, 0) 
 
127.47 1.11 34.54 -2.81 37.35* 
(-90, -60) 
 
28.43 0.33 -2.55 -0.98 -1.56 
(-60, -30)  77.67 0.12 46.69*** -1.19 47.87*** 
(-30, 0)  21.37 0.66 -9.60 -0.65 -8.96 
(0, 30)  11.78 3.66 -19.20 2.35** -21.55* 
(30, 60)  12.09 1.76 -18.89 0.46 -19.35 
(60, 90)  7.96 0.57 -23.02* -0.73 -22.28* 
(0, 90)  31.82 6.00 -61.11*** 2.07 -63.18*** 
(90, 180)  20.20 4.78 -72.73*** 0.85 -73.58*** 
(180, 270)  48.47 3.66 -44.46** -0.27 -44.19** 




Panel E: Low-level Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
66.13 0.92 -6.40 -0.08 -6.32 
(-630, -540) 
 
240.11 2.71 167.58*** 1.71*** 165.87*** 
(-540, -450) 
 
66.52 0.63 -6.02 -0.37 -5.65 
(-450, -360) 
 
53.59 0.61 -18.94 -0.39 -18.55 
(-360, -270) 
 
61.78 1.32 -10.75 0.31 -11.07 
(-270, -180) 
 
72.25 1.26 -0.29 0.26 -0.54 
(-180, -90) 
 
61.46 1.07 -11.07 0.06 -11.13 
(-90, 0) 
 
40.26 0.73 -32.27 -0.27 -32.00 
(-90, -60) 
 
20.24 0.30 -3.94 -0.03 -3.90 
(-60, -30)  10.38 0.18 -13.80 -0.16 -13.64 
(-30, 0)  9.64 0.26 -14.53 -0.08 -14.45 
(0, 30)  5.74 0.89 -18.44 0.56** -19.00 
(30, 60)  3.79 2.38 -20.39 2.04 -22.43 
(60, 90)  2.78 0.88 -21.39 0.55** -21.94 
(0, 90)  12.31 4.15 -60.22** 3.15*** -63.37** 
(90, 180)  24.02 1.49 -48.51 0.48 -48.99* 
(180, 270)  182.28 0.73 109.75*** -0.28 110.03*** 







Panel F: Financial Managers 
Trade 
Interval  






Insider Net Sales 
  (-720, -630) 
 
16.21 0.11 5.54* -0.22 5.76** 
(-630, -540) 
 
16.17 0.16 5.50* -0.17 5.67** 
(-540, -450) 
 
15.62 0.12 4.95* -0.20 5.15* 
(-450, -360) 
 
14.89 0.32 4.22 -0.01 4.23 
(-360, -270) 
 
7.15 0.11 -3.52 -0.21 -3.31 
(-270, -180) 
 
12.36 0.31 1.69 -0.02 1.71 
(-180, -90) 
 
9.42 0.16 -1.25 -0.17 -1.08 
(-90, 0) 
 
7.00 0.39 -3.67 0.06 -3.73 
(-90, -60) 
 
2.48 0.09 -1.08 -0.02 -1.06 
(-60, -30)  4.20 0.03 0.64 -0.08 0.73 
(-30, 0)  0.32 0.27 -3.23* 0.17 -3.40* 
(0, 30)  0.26 0.29 -3.30** 0.18 -3.48** 
(30, 60)  0.19 0.37 -3.37** 0.26 -3.63** 
(60, 90)  0.09 0.03 -3.46** -0.07 -3.39** 
(0, 90)  0.54 0.69 -10.13*** 0.36 -10.49*** 
(90, 180)  2.27 0.50 -8.40*** 0.17 -8.57*** 
(180, 270)  2.13 0.29 -8.54*** -0.03 -8.51*** 
















Insider Net Sales 
 
 (-720, -630) 
 
132.59 5.09 -14.58 0.27 -14.85 
(-630, -540) 
 
313.70 5.19 166.52*** 0.37 166.15*** 
(-540, -450) 
 
150.32 5.71 3.14 0.89 2.26 
(-450, -360) 
 
135.31 1.89 -11.87 -2.93 -8.93 
(-360, -270) 
 
154.54 3.59 7.37 -1.24 8.61 
(-270, -180) 
 
184.87 2.21 37.70 -2.62 40.32 
(-180, -90) 
 
134.13 2.48 -13.04 -2.34 -10.70 
(-90, 0) 
 
160.73 1.46 13.56 -3.37 16.92 
(-90, -60) 
 
46.19 0.54 -2.86 -1.07 -1.80 
(-60, -30)  83.84 0.27 34.78* -1.33 36.12* 
(-30, 0)  30.69 0.64 -18.36 -0.96 -17.40 
(0, 30)  17.26 4.26 -31.80 2.65** -34.45* 
(30, 60)  15.69 3.78 -33.37 2.17 -35.54* 
(60, 90)  10.65 1.42 -38.41* -0.19 -38.22* 
(0, 90)  43.60 9.46 -103.57*** 4.64** -108.21*** 
(90, 180)  41.96 5.77 -105.22*** 0.94 -106.16*** 
(180, 270)  228.62 4.09 81.45** -0.73 82.18** 







Table 8: Comparison of Abnormal Net Sales by Different Types of Insiders (Trade-Based) 
 
We categorize insiders into two distinct groups: i.e. managers, and non-managing insiders. We further divide managers into 
top-level vs. low-level managers, and financial vs. non-financial managers. The table presents results for a series of univariate 
tests in which we compare the net sales by different groups of insiders. Specifically, we compare the abnormal net sales 
between managing and non-managing insiders in Panel A, between top-level managers and low-level managers in Panel B, and 
between financial managers and non-financial managers in Panel C. In columns 2 and 3, we present the average number of 
abnormal net sales during each interval. In columns 4 and 5, we present the median number of abnormal net sales during each 
interval. In columns 6 and 7, we report the results for a t-test of differences in means and for a Kruskal-Wallis test of 
differences in medians, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: Comparison of managing and non-managing insiders 
Trade Interval 
 





















(-720, -630)  7.45 -4.42 -0.17 0.00  0.02* 0.74 
(-630, -540)  5.07 2.78 0.00 0.00  0.25 0.75 
(-540, -450)  4.92 5.20 0.00 0.00  0.93 0.22 
(-450, -360)  3.18 4.13 -0.08 0.00  0.77 0.89 
(-360, -270)  7.54 2.52 0.00 -0.08  0.16 0.09 
(-270, -180)  7.24 4.25 0.00 0.00  0.37 0.31 
(-180, -90)  6.52 2.94 0.00 0.00  0.12 0.11 
(-90, 0)  5.13 2.08 -0.42 -0.17  0.39 0.49 
(-90, -60)  2.14 1.37 -0.19 -0.08  0.55 0.68 
71 
 
(-60, -30)  1.87 1.09 -0.28 -0.06  0.63 0.01** 
(-30, 0)  1.12 -0.39 -0.39 -0.08  0.42 0.00*** 
(0, 30)  -1.26 -1.26 -0.69 -0.19  1.00 0.00*** 
(30, 60)  -0.34 -0.85 -0.61 -0.17  0.60 0.00*** 
(60, 90)  -0.83 -0.58 -0.61 -0.11  0.76 0.00*** 
(0, 90)  -2.44 -2.69 -2.00 -0.75  0.90 0.00*** 
(90, 180)  -2.24 -1.91 -1.33 -0.58  0.87 0.00*** 
(180, 270)  -3.66 -4.89 -1.08 -0.50  0.74 0.00*** 
(270, 360)  -3.30 -3.67 -1.00 -0.42  0.87 0.01** 
 
Panel B: Comparison of top-level and low-level managers 
Trade Interval 
 






















(-720, -630)  4.93 2.52 0.00 -0.17  0.38 0.04* 
(-630, -540)  2.12 2.95 0.00 -0.08  0.41 0.73 
(-540, -450)  2.86 2.06 0.00 -0.08  0.59 0.36 
(-450, -360)  1.99 1.19 0.00 -0.08  0.55 0.39 
(-360, -270)  5.64 1.90 0.00 -0.08  0.12 0.19 
(-270, -180)  3.24 4.00 0.00 -0.08  0.66 0.45 
(-180, -90)  3.28 3.24 0.00 0.00  0.98 0.97 
(-90, 0)  4.64 0.50 -0.08 -0.33  0.03 0.03 
(-90, -60)  1.32 0.82 -0.06 -0.14  0.51 0.06 
(-60, -30)  1.85 0.02 -0.08 -0.22  0.07 0.00*** 
(-30, 0)  1.47 -0.35 -0.14 -0.28  0.06 0.00*** 
72 
 
(0, 30)  -0.40 -0.87 -0.19 -0.36  0.40 0.01** 
(30, 60)  0.43 -0.77 -0.17 -0.33  0.15 0.00*** 
(60, 90)  -0.05 -0.79 -0.17 -0.36  0.22 0.00*** 
(0, 90)  -0.01 -2.42 -0.58 -1.08  0.11 0.00*** 
(90, 180)  -0.91 -1.33 -0.42 -0.75  0.78 0.10 
(180, 270)  -1.90 -1.76 -0.50 -0.67  0.90 0.36 
(270, 360)  -2.14 -1.16 -0.42 -0.58  0.42 0.27 
 
Panel C: Comparison of financial managers and non-financial managers 
Trade Interval 
 






















(-720, -630)  1.62 5.34 0.00 -0.17  0.20 0.04* 
(-630, -540)  0.25 4.32 0.00 -0.08  0.00*** 0.09 
(-540, -450)  0.09 4.34 0.00 0.00  0.01** 0.62 
(-450, -360)  0.08 2.61 0.00 -0.08  0.09 0.26 
(-360, -270)  0.24 6.81 0.00 -0.17  0.01** 0.32 
(-270, -180)  0.17 6.58 0.00 -0.08  0.00*** 0.20 
(-180, -90)  -0.05 6.08 0.00 0.00  0.00*** 0.45 
(-90, 0)  -0.14 4.78 0.00 -0.50  0.01** 0.00*** 
(-90, -60)  0.03 1.95 -0.03 -0.19  0.01** 0.00*** 
(-60, -30)  0.06 1.64 -0.03 -0.33  0.13 0.00*** 
(-30, 0)  -0.22 1.18 -0.03 -0.42  0.16 0.00*** 
(0, 30)  -0.30 -1.13 -0.03 -0.69  0.20 0.00*** 
(30, 60)  -0.28 -0.22 -0.03 -0.58  0.95 0.00*** 
73 
 
(60, 90)  -0.24 -0.75 -0.03 -0.56  0.48 0.00*** 
(0, 90)  -0.82 -2.10 -0.08 -1.92  0.48 0.00*** 
(90, 180)  -0.61 -2.12 -0.08 -1.25  0.38 0.00*** 
(180, 270)  -0.42 -3.73 -0.08 -1.08  0.01** 0.00*** 




























Table 9: Comparison of Abnormal Net Sales by Different Types of Insiders (Volume-Based) 
 
We categorize insiders into two distinct groups: i.e. managers, and non-managing insiders. We further divide managers into 
top-level vs. low-level managers, and financial vs. non-financial managers. The table presents results for a series of univariate 
tests in which we compare the net sales by different groups of insiders. Specifically, we compare the abnormal net sales 
between managing and non-managing insiders in Panel A, between top-level managers and low-level managers in Panel B, and 
between financial managers and non-financial managers in Panel C. In column 2 and 3, we present the average number of 
abnormal net sales during each interval. In column 4 and 5, we present the median number of abnormal net sales during each 
interval. In column 6 and 7, we report the results for a t-test of differences in means and for a Kruskal-Wallis test of differences 
in medians, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A: Comparison of managing and non-managing insiders 
Trade Interval 



















(-720, -630)  -16.94 -252.00 -2.11 -1.17  0.17 0.89 
(-630, -540)  163.99 37.36 -1.16 -1.19  0.70 0.44 
(-540, -450)  -0.43 -223.72 -2.32 -1.67  0.14 0.69 
(-450, -360)  -12.54 -182.22 -2.19 -1.56  0.48 0.76 
(-360, -270)  -2.54 -360.37 -2.03 -2.37  0.03* 0.23 
(-270, -180)  34.18 -360.29 -1.17 -3.33  0.02* 0.02* 
(-180, -90)  -19.63 -354.73 -1.22 -3.29  0.04* 0.06 
(-90, 0)  5.35 -344.03 -4.51 -4.06  0.04* 0.57 
(-90, -60)  -5.47 -123.15 -2.32 -2.05  0.03* 0.90 
75 
 
(-60, -30)  34.23 -87.63 -3.40 -1.92  0.11 0.17 
(-30, 0)  -23.41 -133.24 -6.65 -1.75  0.04* 0.00*** 
(0, 30)  -40.54 -119.30 -9.50 -2.90  0.20 0.00*** 
(30, 60)  -41.78 -209.67 -8.75 -2.94  0.29 0.00*** 
(60, 90)  -44.22 -135.27 -8.58 -2.42  0.09 0.00*** 
(0, 90)  -126.54 -464.24 -25.83 -8.82  0.13 0.00*** 
(90, 180)  -122.57 -398.53 -22.77 -7.28  0.09 0.00*** 
(180, 270)  65.83 -257.96 -22.09 -7.28  0.25 0.00*** 
(270, 360)  -110.57 -301.89 -17.88 -7.84  0.31 0.17 
 
Panel B: Comparison of top-level and low-level managers 
Trade Interval 
 






















(-720, -630)  -10.61 -6.32 -0.17 -1.59  0.83 0.49 
(-630, -540)  -1.88 165.87 -0.05 -1.25  0.30 0.48 
(-540, -450)  5.21 -5.65 -0.17 -1.01  0.62 0.79 
(-450, -360)  6.01 -18.55 -0.67 -1.19  0.27 0.88 
(-360, -270)  8.53 -11.07 -0.83 -1.03  0.38 0.49 
(-270, -180)  34.73 -0.54 -0.05 -1.25  0.32 0.67 
(-180, -90)  -8.50 -11.13 -1.09 -1.00  0.89 0.48 
(-90, 0)  37.35 -32.00 -2.00 -3.58  0.22 0.58 
(-90, -60)  -1.56 -3.90 -0.77 -1.34  0.76 0.79 
(-60, -30)  47.87 -13.64 -1.53 -2.17  0.19 0.28 
(-30, 0)  -8.96 -14.45 -2.41 -2.55  0.59 0.55 
76 
 
(0, 30)  -21.55 -19.00 -3.68 -3.12  0.76 0.92 
(30, 60)  -19.35 -22.43 -3.54 -3.00  0.70 0.61 
(60, 90)  -22.28 -21.94 -3.53 -3.28  0.96 0.68 
(0, 90)  -63.18 -63.37 -10.79 -8.71  0.99 0.94 
(90, 180)  -73.58 -48.99 -8.36 -6.34  0.11 0.23 
(180, 270)  -44.19 110.03 -9.52 -6.03  0.35 0.11 
(270, 360)  -69.73 -40.84 -7.42 -6.23  0.10 0.40 
 
Panel C: Comparison of financial managers and non-financial managers 
Trade Interval 
 






















(-720, -630)  5.76 -14.85 0.00 -3.41  0.29 0.00*** 
(-630, -540)  5.67 166.15 0.00 -2.17  0.32 0.00*** 
(-540, -450)  5.15 2.26 0.00 -2.19  0.90 0.00*** 
(-450, -360)  4.23 -8.93 0.00 -3.45  0.51 0.00*** 
(-360, -270)  -3.31 8.61 0.00 -3.14  0.58 0.00*** 
(-270, -180)  1.71 40.32 0.00 -1.81  0.28 0.03* 
(-180, -90)  -1.08 -10.70 0.00 -1.70  0.61 0.03* 
(-90, 0)  -3.73 16.92 -0.03 -5.38  0.70 0.00*** 
(-90, -60)  -1.06 -1.80 -0.11 -2.70  0.93 0.00*** 
(-60, -30)  0.73 36.12 -0.10 -4.39  0.43 0.00*** 
(-30, 0)  -3.40 -17.40 -0.17 -6.56  0.18 0.00*** 
(0, 30)  -3.48 -34.45 -0.22 -8.78  0.00*** 0.00*** 
(30, 60)  -3.63 -35.54 -0.23 -8.79  0.00*** 0.00*** 
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(60, 90)  -3.39 -38.22 -0.22 -8.48  0.00*** 0.00*** 
(0, 90)  -10.49 -108.21 -0.71 -24.78  0.00*** 0.00*** 
(90, 180)  -8.57 -106.16 -0.50 -20.83  0.00*** 0.00*** 
(180, 270)  -8.51 82.18 -0.63 -20.73  0.58 0.00*** 




























Table 10: Preliminary Examination of Abnormal Cumulative Returns 
 
We form several subsets of our litigation sample along various dimensions. In particular, we distinguish between small and 
large firms (based on the sued firms’ market capitalization), between firms with a high or low market-to-book ratio, between 
firms with high or low volatility, between tech or non-tech firms, between accounting-related lawsuits and 
non-accounting-related lawsuits, and between firms with net abnormal sales and firms with net abnormal purchases (on a trade 
basis and volume basis) in the latest quarter prior to the announcement of a lawsuit filing. For each subsample, we report the 
number of observations N, as well as the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during a (-5, 0) event window. 
We employ t-tests and Kruskal-Wallis tests to test for the equality of mean and median CARs between each set of subsamples. 
The last column reports p-values for both tests. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 
0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Subsample 1 N 
 
















Large firms 271 
 
Small firms 272 
  
(Market capitalization > $1454.94 m) -6.44% 
 









       








(market-to-book ratio > 2.112) -8.87% 
 









       
Firms with high volatility 271 
 
Firms with low volatility 272 
  
(volatility > 2.984%) -7.16% 
 









       
79 
 
Firms in the technology industry 113 
 














       
Accounting-related lawsuits 165 
 














       




















       



































Table 11: Preliminary Examination of Abnormal Net Sales 
 
We form several subsets of our litigation sample along various dimensions. In particular, we distinguish between small and 
large firms (based on the sued firms’ market capitalization), between firms with a high or low market-to-book ratio, between 
firms with high or low volatility, between tech or non-tech firms, between accounting-related lawsuits and 
non-accounting-related lawsuits, and between firms with a stock price runup and firms with a stock price decline at the end of 
the class period. For each subsample, we report the number of observations N, as well as mean and median cumulative 
abnormal net sales in the latest quarter prior to the lawsuit filings. We present the results for trade-based net sales in Panel A 
and volume-based net sales (in thousands) in Panel B, respectively. We employ t-tests and Kruskal-Wallis tests to test for the 
equality of mean and median abnormal net sales between each set of subsamples. The last column reports p-values for both 
tests. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a 
two-tailed test.  
Panel A:  Trade-based Abnormal Net Sales 
Subsample 1 N 
 
















Large firms 271 
 
Small firms 272 
  
(Market capitalization > $1454.94m) 11.37 
 









       








(market-to-book ratio > 2.112) 9.19 
 









       
Firms with high volatility 271 
 
Firms with low volatility 272 
  
(volatility > 2.984%) 1.40 
 











       
Firms in the technology industry 113 
 














       
Accounting-related lawsuits 165 
 














       
Firms with a stock price runup 69 
 















Panel B:  Volume-based Abnormal Net Sales 
Subsample 1 N 
 
















Large firms 271 
 
Small firms 272 
  
(Market capitalization > $1454.94 m) -412.665 
 









       








(market-to-book ratio > 2.112) -371.949 
 









       
82 
 
Firms with high volatility 271 
 
Firms with low volatility 272 
  
(volatility > 2.984%) -526.098 
 









       
Firms in the technology industry 113 
 














       
Accounting-related lawsuits 165 
 














       
Firms with a stock price runup 69 
 
































Table 12: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Stock Returns 
 
We examine whether investors distinguish between different types of lawsuits by regressing the cumulative abnormal returns 
over assorted event windows against various characteristics of the lawsuits and the sued firms. We characterize sued firms by 
firm size based on the sued firms’ market capitalization (MC), market-to-book ratio (MB), volatility of stock returns (VOL), 
and industry types identified by four dummy variables (IND1 – IND4). Specifically, we differentiate between firms that operate 
in a regulated industry, as well as firms that operate in the financial, technology, or retail sector. All other firms are captured by 
a separate dummy variable. We further include eight dummy variables to differentiate between different types of allegations in 
our lawsuit sample (LT1-LT8). Finally, we include abnormal net insider sales in the last quarter prior to the lawsuit filings (ANS) 
as an independent variable. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value in parentheses below. 




















-0.0638 -0.0762 -0.1057 -0.1305   
  
(0.0110)* (0.0090)** (0.0010)** (0.0000)***   
MC 
 
0.0002 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009  1.20 
  
(0.3870) (0.0680) (0.0150) (0.0080)**   
MB 
 
-0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0009  1.02 
  
(0.1130) (0.1060) (0.1930) (0.3190)   
VOL 
 
0.1461 0.0579 -0.2166 -0.0618  1.18 
  
(0.7390) (0.9100) (0.6990) (0.9210)   
IND1 
 
0.0552 0.0382 0.0278 0.0266  1.10 
  
(0.0910) (0.3140) (0.5030) (0.5640)   
IND2 
 




(0.9910) (0.9060) (0.9750) (0.8460)   
IND3 
 
-0.0034 -0.0110 -0.0277 -0.0219  1.23 
  
(0.8710) (0.6530) (0.3040) (0.4630)   
IND4 
 
0.0756 0.1107 0.0991 0.1004  1.07 
  
(0.0530) (0.0150)* (0.0460)* (0.0690)   
LT1 
 
-0.0694 -0.0385 0.0363 0.0458  1.08 
  
(0.2460) (0.5800) (0.6340) (0.5880)   
LT2 
 
0.0094 -0.0053 -0.0113 -0.0242  1.15 
  
(0.5740) (0.7880) (0.5990) (0.3090)   
LT3 
 
-0.0033 -0.0107 -0.0028 -0.0108  1.05 
  
(0.8580) (0.6200) (0.9070) (0.6820)   
LT4 
 
-0.0258 -0.0395 -0.0450 -0.0533  1.13 
  
(0.1700) (0.0710) (0.0610) (0.0460)*   
LT5 
 
-0.0569 -0.0613 -0.0435 -0.0613  1.17 
  
(0.0070)** (0.0130)* (0.1060) (0.0400)*   
LT6 
 
-0.0379 -0.0578 -0.0400 -0.0431  1.12 
  
(0.0740) (0.0190)* (0.1390) (0.1510)   
LT7 
 
-0.0137 -0.0121 0.0047 0.0145  1.19 
  
(0.7060) (0.7750) (0.9190) (0.7780)   
LT8 
 
0.0498 -0.0231 -0.0276 -0.0484  1.04 
  
(0.1510) (0.5660) (0.5330) (0.3230)   
ANS 
 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001  1.04 
  





2.40% 3.10% 2.12% 2.60%   
F-Statistic 
 








Table 13: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Insider Trading 
 
The table provides results for a series of regressions of abnormal insider trading against a variety of variables that characterize the 
lawsuits and the sued firms. We characterize sued firms by firm size based on the sued firms’ market capitalization (MC), 
market-to-book ratio (MB), volatility of stock returns (VOL), and industry types identified by four dummy variables (IND1 – 
IND4). Specifically, we differentiate between firms that operate in a regulated industry, as well as firms that operate in the 
financial, technology, or retail sector. All other firms are captured by a separate dummy variable. We further include eight 
dummy variables to differentiate between different types of allegations in our lawsuits sample (LT1-LT8). RET measures the 
abnormal stock return of each sued firm at the end of the class period. The dependent variables are i) abnormal insider sales, ii) 
abnormal insider purchases, and iii) abnormal net insider sales. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the 
corresponding p-value in parentheses below. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 




Number of insider transactions 
































Intercept  18.2585 -4.1518 22.4103  -387.6124 -37.2993 -350.3130   
 
 (0.0400 )* (0.4130) (0.0290)*  (0.5060 ) (0.0190 ) (0.5480)   
MC  -0.1192 -0.0061 -0.1131  3.5821 0.0450 3.5370  1.23 
 
 (0.1480) (0.8970) (0.2360)  (0.5080) (0.7600) (0.5130)   
MB  0.1014 0.0092 0.0922  3.9895 -0.1861 4.1755  1.02 
 
 (0.6400) (0.9410) (0.7140)  (0.7800) (0.6310) (0.7700)   
VOL  -230.1087 27.3956 -257.5043  -2590.6120 667.4898 -3258.1020  1.19 
 
 (0.1270) (0.7500) (0.1400)  (0.7930) (0.0130)* (0.7420)   




 (0.3010) (0.8020) (0.4410)  (0.8900) (0.4970) (0.8750)   
IND2  -4.8300 -1.3117 -3.5182  124.9424 10.5112 114.4313  1.28 
 
 (0.5360) (0.7690) (0.6970)  (0.8070) (0.4510) (0.8230)   
IND3  -4.1186 -0.9532 -3.1653  -572.7509 -7.4489 -565.3020  1.23 
 
 (0.5690) (0.8170) (0.7050)  (0.2280) (0.5640) (0.2340)   
IND4  22.5870 -3.1049 25.6919  777.6352 15.3974 762.2379  1.07 
 
 (0.0910) (0.6840) (0.0970)  (0.3750) (0.5190) (0.3850)   
LT1  27.5059 2.1197 25.3862  24.7259 43.6531 -18.9272  1.08 
 
 (0.1790) (0.8560) (0.2830)  (0.9850) (0.2320) (0.9890)   
LT2  -11.0779 5.9138 -16.9916  -165.4262 18.6306 -184.0568  1.14 
 
 (0.0530) (0.0700) (0.0100)*  (0.6590) (0.0690) (0.6240)   
LT3  14.5502 -0.9822 15.5324  31.8124 -10.7650 42.5773  1.04 
 
 (0.0220)* (0.7860) (0.0350)*  (0.9390) (0.3430) (0.9190)   
LT4  11.1713 8.0675 3.1037  13.3877 4.9422 8.4455  1.13 
 
 (0.0840) (0.0290)* (0.6780)  (0.9750) (0.6690) (0.9840)   
LT5  -1.8434 3.0205 -4.8639  195.3871 6.3663 189.0208  1.17 
 
 (0.7980) (0.4640) (0.5600)  (0.6800) (0.6220) (0.6900)   
LT6  -6.9997 -1.4827 -5.5170  -254.1349 -5.8909 -248.2440  1.12 
 
 (0.3340) (0.7200) (0.5100)  (0.5930) (0.6490) (0.6020)   
LT7  2.4471 5.9573 -3.5101  -96.1608 15.0757 -111.2364  1.19 
 
 (0.8440) (0.4020) (0.8080)  (0.9060) (0.4980) (0.8920)   
LT8  11.3150 -1.7783 13.0933  1292.1370 -40.2323 1332.3690  1.04 
 
 (0.3400) (0.7930) (0.3400)  (0.0970) (0.0580) (0.0870)   
RET  -2.4235 -4.9269 2.5034  -671.9285 -15.3170 -656.6116  1.12 
 
 (0.8720) (0.5650) (0.8850)  (0.4950) (0.5680) (0.5050)   
Adjusted R
2
  1.52% -1.06% 0.97%  -1.77% 0.49% -1.73%   






Table 14: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Net Insider Sales on CARs 
The table provides results for a series of regressions of abnormal net insider sales on CARs over a (-5, 0) event window, 
controlling for a variety of variables that characterize the lawsuits and the sued firms. We characterize sued firms by firm size 
based on the sued firms’ market capitalization (MC), market-to-book ratio (MB), volatility of stock returns (VOL), and 
industry types identified by four dummy variables (IND1 – IND4). Specifically, we differentiate between firms that operate in a 
regulated industry, as well as firms that operate in the financial, technology, or retail sector. All other firms are captured by a 
separate dummy variable. We further include eight dummy variables to differentiate between different types of allegations in 
our lawsuits sample (LT1-LT8). RET measures the abnormal stock return of each sued firms at the end of the class period. The 
dependent variables are i) abnormal net insider sales measured in terms of the number of transactions (Panel A) and ii) 
abnormal net insider sales measured in terms of the number of shares traded (Panel B). For each variable, we report the 
coefficient and the corresponding p-value in parentheses below. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A:  Trade-based Abnormal Net Sales 
 
 






























Intercept  22.4095 8.0414 14.3681 6.3489 1.6924 -0.1828 7.8092   
 
 (0.0290)* (0.2420) (0.1390) (0.2500) (0.5750) (0.8190) (0.2330)   
CAR  1.9623 2.1996 -0.2373 3.7774 -1.5778 2.1685 -0.4579  1.25 
 
 (0.9170) (0.8610) (0.9890) (0.7080) (0.7750) (0.1390) (0.9700)   
MC  -0.1128 -0.0870 -0.0258 -0.0603 -0.0267 -0.0042 -0.0851  1.23 
 
 (0.2370) (0.1730) (0.7750) (0.2390) (0.3410) (0.5740) (0.1620)   
MB  0.0944 0.0976 -0.0031 -0.0102 0.1077 0.0098 0.0904  1.02 
 
 (0.7080) (0.5630) (0.9890) (0.9400) (0.1470) (0.6190) (0.5740)   




 (0.1390) (0.7430) (0.1830) (0.9170) (0.5800) (0.1550) (0.6410)   
IND1  -10.0167 -1.7187 -8.2981 -2.2400 0.5214 0.0244 -1.8604  1.1 
 
 (0.4390) (0.8430) (0.4980) (0.7470) (0.8910) (0.9810) (0.8220)   
IND2  -3.4803 1.1229 -4.6033 -1.7839 2.9068 -1.2727 2.6708  1.29 
 
 (0.7010) (0.8530) (0.5910) (0.7140) (0.2750) (0.0710) (0.6440)   
IND3  -3.1529 -1.0498 -2.1030 -0.7536 -0.2962 -0.2255 -1.3022  1.23 
 
 (0.7060) (0.8510) (0.7910) (0.8670) (0.9040) (0.7290) (0.8070)   
IND4  25.6144 14.6591 10.9554 13.3178 1.3413 -0.1284 14.9051  1.08 
 
 (0.0980) (0.1570) (0.4550) (0.1100) (0.7680) (0.9150) (0.1320)   
LT1  25.5390 31.5324 -5.9934 10.1441 21.3882 -1.2520 33.6621  1.08 
 
 (0.2820) (0.0470)* (0.7890) (0.4260) (0.0020)** (0.4980) (0.0260)*   
LT2  -17.0219 -2.9124 -14.1095 -4.5463 1.6339 0.2884 -3.1800  1.14 
 
 (0.0100)* (0.5110) (0.0250)* (0.2020) (0.4010) (0.5760) (0.4520)   
LT3  15.5467 3.4848 12.0619 6.3920 -2.9072 0.1176 2.6480  1.04 
 
 (0.0350) (0.4780) (0.0830) (0.1060) (0.1790) (0.8370) (0.5720)   
LT4  3.1282 6.6632 -3.5349 6.7866 -0.1235 0.1716 6.1275  1.13 
 
 (0.6760) (0.1830) (0.6170) (0.0920) (0.9550) (0.7680) (0.2000)   
LT5  -4.7702 6.8479 -11.6180 7.3755 -0.5276 1.2092 5.9149  1.18 
 
 (0.5710) (0.2240) (0.1440) (0.1030) (0.8310) (0.0650) (0.2700)   
LT6  -5.4366 -6.4635 1.0268 -6.0468 -0.4166 -0.4235 -5.8027  1.12 
 
 (0.5190) (0.2520) (0.8970) (0.1820) (0.8660) (0.5190) (0.2810)   
LT7  -3.4533 -2.9406 -0.5127 0.6294 -3.5700 0.3981 -3.7489  1.19 
 
 (0.8110) (0.7610) (0.9700) (0.9350) (0.4000) (0.7230) (0.6840)   
LT8  13.0195 5.5324 7.4870 0.1800 5.3525 0.2768 5.0489  1.05 
 
 (0.3440) (0.5470) (0.5650) (0.9810) (0.1850) (0.7960) (0.5650)   
RET  1.7292 17.6129 -15.8838 11.4124 6.2006 2.9024 15.0113  1.32 
 
 (0.9270) (0.1630) (0.3740) (0.2610) (0.2640) (0.0490)* (0.2130)   
Adjusted R
2
  0.78% -0.10% -0.69% 0.06% 0.43% 0.50% 0.02%   




Panel B:  Volume-based Abnormal Net Sales 
 
 































Intercept  -350.0501 -154.8347 -195.2154 -125.5945 -29.2402 -12.1630 -123.5906   
 
 (0.5480) (0.4000) (0.7230) (0.4850) (0.4450) (0.1270) (0.4870)   
CAR  -846.5432 -735.6407 -110.9026 -671.1958 -64.4449 -12.3822 -710.9074  1.25 
 
 (0.4270) (0.0290)* (0.9120) (0.0420)* (0.3570) (0.3960) (0.0290)*   
MC  3.4089 2.6996 0.7093 3.7011 -1.0015 0.0252 2.8561  1.23 
 
 (0.5290) (0.1140) (0.8900) (0.0270)* (0.0050)** (0.7330) (0.0840)   
MB  3.2095 4.4442 -1.2346 4.5724 -0.1283 -0.0081 4.5187  1.02 
 
 (0.8230) (0.3250) (0.9270) (0.3000) (0.8910) (0.9670) (0.3010)   
VOL  -2758.4820 4778.4130 -7536.8940 4889.5220 -111.1091 205.0364 4440.1990  1.20 
 
 (0.7810) (0.1270) (0.4210) (0.1100) (0.8650) (0.1310) (0.1430)   
IND1  146.9096 65.3996 81.5100 37.6023 27.7973 -0.7384 42.7268  1.1 
 
 (0.8410) (0.7780) (0.9060) (0.8680) (0.5640) (0.9410) (0.8490)   
IND2  98.1068 -176.0193 274.1261 -184.7934 8.7741 0.0216 -170.9759  1.29 
 
 (0.8480) (0.2770) (0.5720) (0.2430) (0.7950) (0.9980) (0.2750)   
IND3  -570.6718 -303.5605 -267.1113 -312.1229 8.5624 -7.5050 -303.2951  1.23 
 
 (0.2300) (0.0430)* (0.5510) (0.0330)* (0.7840) (0.2480) (0.0370)*   
IND4  795.7011 -98.5945 894.2957 -75.2821 -23.3125 2.2847 -108.8588  1.08 
 
 (0.3650) (0.7220) (0.2810) (0.7810) (0.6860) (0.8490) (0.6850)   
LT1  -84.8472 -214.8336 129.9864 -112.7504 -102.0832 -13.3145 -166.0374  1.08 
 
 (0.9500) (0.6130) (0.9180) (0.7860) (0.2480) (0.4690) (0.6860)   
LT2  -171.0114 -39.1568 -131.8546 -23.0190 -16.1378 1.6960 -53.7877  1.14 
 
 (0.6490) (0.7410) (0.7100) (0.8430) (0.5130) (0.7410) (0.6390)   
90 
 
LT3  36.4271 306.1808 -269.7537 299.1660 7.0149 5.2109 286.3077  1.04 
 
 (0.9300) (0.0200)* (0.4930) (0.0200)* (0.7980) (0.3610) (0.0250)*   
LT4  -2.1380 8.9829 -11.1209 -28.4056 37.3885 2.5745 -0.6311  1.13 
 
 (0.9960) (0.9470) (0.9780) (0.8280) (0.1800) (0.6570) (0.9960)   
LT5  148.5513 -55.4181 203.9694 -50.7064 -4.7117 -2.6077 -56.3106  1.18 
 
 (0.7560) (0.7130) (0.6510) (0.7300) (0.8800) (0.6890) (0.6990)   
LT6  -282.9009 -200.0488 -82.8521 -190.9840 -9.0649 -4.0761 -181.8138  1.12 
 
 (0.5540) (0.1850) (0.8540) (0.1950) (0.7730) (0.5330) (0.2130)   
LT7  -135.7497 -140.7144 4.9647 -152.4013 11.6869 2.1706 -136.3272  1.19 
 
 (0.8680) (0.5860) (0.9950) (0.5460) (0.8280) (0.8460) (0.5850)   





(0.8550) (0.0000)*** (0.0830) (0.0030) (0.0000)***   
REt  -322.9998 473.0489 -796.0486 472.7208 0.3281 7.8037 451.9434  1.32 
 
 (0.7630) (0.1620) (0.4310) (0.1530) (0.9960) (0.5940) (0.1670)   
Adjusted R
2
  -1.80% 5.24% -2.29% 5.12% 0.10% -0.31% 5.26%   




Figure 1: Average Abnormal Returns during the 250 Days before and after 
Securities Class Action Announcements 
 
This figure presents average abnormal returns (AARs) during the 250 trading days prior 
to and after securities class action announcements. Our sample consists of 543 securities 
class action lawsuits filed between January 2000 and December 2008. Daily abnormal 
returns are derived from the market model that uses the CRSP equally-weighted index as 









Insider Groups Relationship Code Description 
Managers 
CB Chairman of the Board 
H Officer, Director, and Beneficial Owner 
OD Officer and Director 
AV Assistant Vice President 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CI Chief Investment Officer 
CO Chief Operating Officer 
CT Chief Technology Officer 
EVP Executive Vice President 
O Officer 
OB 
Officer and Beneficial Owner of more than 10% 
of a Class of Security 
OP Officer of Parent Company 
OS Officer of Subsidiary Company 
OT Officer and Treasurer 
OX Divisional Officer 
P President 
S Secretary 
SVP Senior Vice President 
VP Vice President 
C Controller 
CP Controlling Person 
GM General Manager 













Director and Beneficial Owner of more than 10% 
of a Class of Security 
VC Vice Chairman 
AC Member of the Advisory Committee 
CC Member of the Compensation Committee 
EC Member of the Executive Committee 
FC Member of the Finance Committee 
MC Member of Committee or Advisory Board 
SC Member of the Science/Technology Committee 
AF Affiliated Person 
AI Affiliate of Investment Advisor 
GC General Counsel 
IA Investment Advisor 
B 
Beneficial Owner of more than 10% of a Class of 
Security 
BC Beneficial Owner as Custodian 
BT Beneficial Owner as Trustee 
DS Indirect Shareholder 
F Founder 
FO Former 
GP General Partner 
LP Limited Partner 
M Managing Partner 












Insider Groups Relationship Code Description 
Top-level 
Managers 
CB Chairman of the Board 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CI Chief Investment Officer 
CO Chief Operating Officer 




H Officer, Director and Beneficial Owner 
OD Officer and Director 
AV Assistant Vice President 
EVP Executive Vice President 
O Officer 
OB 
Officer and Beneficial Owner of more than 10% 
of a Class of Security 
OP Officer of Parent Company 
OS Officer of Subsidiary Company 
OT Officer and Treasurer 
OX Divisional Officer 
S Secretary 
SVP Senior Vice President 
VP Vice President 
C Controller 
CP Controlling Person 
GM General Manager 




CFO Chief Financial Officer 










Insider Groups Relationship Code Description 
Non-financial 
Management 
CB Chairman of the Board 
H Officer, Director and Beneficial Owner 
OD Officer and Director 
AV Assistant Vice President 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CI Chief Investment Officer 
CO Chief Operating Officer 
CT Chief Technology Officer 
EVP Executive Vice President 
O Officer 
OB 
Officer and Beneficial Owner of more than 10% 
of a Class of Security 
OP Officer of Parent Company 
OS Officer of Subsidiary Company 
OX Divisional Officer 
P President 
S Secretary 
SVP Senior Vice President 
VP Vice President 
CP Controlling Person 
GM General Manager 
OE Other Executive 
 
